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Symposium Article
Transitional Post-Occupation Obligations under the Law
of Belligerent Occupation
Dana Wolf

Abstract
Today’s armed conflicts present far more varied and complex
circumstances of occupation, extending beyond the traditional
model of interstate war on which the law of belligerent occupation
was originally based. As a result, confusion abounds regarding
when the duties and obligations of an occupier are triggered,
while scholarly debate revolves around the meaning of the law of
belligerent occupation and its alleged inadequacies in the
transition from occupied to post-occupied territory. The
unfortunate consequence is that civilian populations often face
serious humanitarian risk at the conclusion of a belligerent
occupation.
Various proposals attempt to remedy this gap by addressing
whether international law imposes continuing duties upon a
former occupier with respect to a previously occupied territory
and the civilian population. Focusing on the law of belligerent
occupation, this article argues that, as a legal matter, the law of
belligerent occupation does not create an ongoing regime of post
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occupation duties for the former occupier. However, the law of
belligerent occupation offers possibilities to address the problem
of civilian protection through an expanded understanding of
coordinated transition from the former occupier to the returning
sovereign. To fill the legal vacuum, this article proposes that some
form of limited transitional post-occupation obligations should
be triggered under certain circumstances when the end of
occupation is approaching and identifiable gaps exist in essential
governance and civilian protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The unfortunate consequence of contemporary conflicts is
the serious humanitarian risk that civilian populations often
face at the conclusion of a belligerent occupation. Due to open
legal questions and gaps in the law, there is no consensus
regarding which obligations concerning governance, security,
and public order are assigned to parties in a conflict. Calls in the
international community to fill at least some of these gaps
through legal rubrics, such as post-occupation duties,
irrespective of the body of law from which they originate, aim to
address the practical, undeniable needs of affected civilian
populations.1
This issue of civilian protection in post-occupation
situations became a focus of discussion among international law
scholars in reaction to two events: the Security Council
Resolution to end the occupation by the Coalition forces in Iraq
in 2004 and the case of Gaza after Israel’s unilateral withdrawal
in 2005.2 In the latter instance, multiple legal issues arose with
1. A complete answer to the international law question of post-occupation
duties would have to take into account several major bodies of international
law, including the law of belligerent occupation, (international humanitarian
law), international human rights law, the law of state responsibility, and others.
This article confines itself to an examination of the question solely under the
law of belligerent occupation. It sets aside other bodies of international law for
another day, save for brief asides to suggest possible directions for synthesizing
a full legal analysis.
2. See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 9–10,
254–55 (2d ed. 2012). In 2004, the U.N. Security Council recognized the end of
the United States-led occupation of Iraq, despite the fact that military troops
remained in Iraq until 2011, retaining a substantive level of control over the
territory. S.C. Res. 1546 (June 8, 2004) (“Welcoming the beginning of a new
phase in Iraq’s transition to a democratically elected government, and looking
forward to the end of the occupation and the assumption of full responsibility
and authority by a fully sovereign and independent Interim Government of Iraq
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regard to the application of the law of belligerent occupation,
based on the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) decision in the
Al-Bassiouni case (2008).3 It is significant that these are the only
two cases where the law of belligerent occupation was invoked
and adhered to by an occupying state.4
Civilian protection became primary because today’s armed
conflicts present far more varied and complex circumstances of
occupation, extending beyond the traditional model of interstate
war on which the law of belligerent occupation was originally
based. According to the traditional interstate war paradigm,
occupation is a temporary incident of conflict that begins with a
hostile army invading a territory, establishing its forces there
and exercising effective control over the territory and its
population.5
As follows, reversal of these elements signifies the end of
occupation. In some cases, this event might be conterminous
with the end of the conflict, wherein a negotiated peace

by 30 June 2004.”). The presence of United States-led forces after the end of
occupation was ratified by an agreement with the local temporary government.
BENVENISTI, supra, at 254–55.
3. HCJ 9132/07 Gaber Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister. ¶¶ 12–15 (2008)
(Isr.) (unpublished), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/07/320/091320.n25.htm.
In 2008, following ongoing acts of hostility by Hamas against Israeli citizens
and Israel’s decision to impose further restrictions upon the Hamas regime
including fuel and electricity reductions, a petition was filed to the Israeli HCJ
against the government’s decision. The HCJ confronted the question of whether
the various restrictions upon the supply of fuel and electricity to Gaza harmed
the essential humanitarian needs of the local residents. The court stated: “We
should point out in this context that since September 2005 Israel no longer has
effective control over what happens in the Gaza Strip. Military rule that applies
in the past in this territory came to an end by a decision of the government, and
Israeli soldiers are no longer stationed in the territory on a permanent basis,
nor are they in charge of what happens there. In these circumstances, the State
of Israel does not have a general duty to ensure the welfare of the residents of
the Gaza Strip or to maintain public order in the Gaza Strip according to the
laws of belligerent occupation in international law. Neither does Israel have any
effective capability, in its present position, of enforcing order and managing
civilian life in the Gaza Strip. In the prevailing circumstances, the main
obligations of the State of Israel relating to the residents of the Gaza Strip
derive from the state of armed conflict that exist between it and the Hamas
organization that controls the Gaza Strip; these obligations also derive from the
degree of control exercised by the State of Israel over the border crossing
between it and the Gaza Strip, as well as from the relationship that was created
between Israel and the territory of the Gaza Strip after the years of Israeli
military rule in the territory, as a result of which the Gaza Strip is currently
almost completely dependent upon the supply of electricity from Israel.” Id.
4. BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 203, 249.
5. Id.
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agreement includes a reversion of the rights and duties of
governance from the occupier back to the sovereign. In other
cases, however, this event may be merely a withdrawal of
occupation under the adversary’s military pressure as the
greater conflict continues. Whether the conflict continues or
ends with the occupation, the law of belligerent occupation is
best understood to mean that the former occupier is no longer
subject to the legal duties of occupation (except for the legal
requirements to remedy wrongs done during the occupation).
Due to the changed circumstances of many occupations
today, confusion abounds as to when the duties and obligations
of an occupier are triggered. Contemporary conflicts range
across a wide variety of contexts, rendering many shades of gray
rather than a simple on-off switch for determining when an
occupation is underway. When no such bright line for occupation
exists, there is also no clear trigger to signal when the
responsibilities of the occupier for governance of the occupied
territory and its population begin and end. These contemporary
situations can include any of the following: refusal by a state to
even acknowledge that its military forces are occupying
territory, or recognize that it has the duties of an occupier
according to the law of belligerent occupation; questions of
whether occupation law applies to contemporary, legally novel
situations of humanitarian intervention where armed conflict is
undertaken for the protection of the population of the “occupied”
territory from its own government; situations in which the
armed forces of the occupying state only gradually withdraw or
unilaterally withdrawal, leaving open legal questions as to
whether or when the occupation—and, presumably, the duties of
the occupier—come to an end and over what timeframe;
situations in which the legal status of foreign armed forces
changes through agreement with the new government of the
legitimate sovereign or by a binding determination of the United
Nations Security Council.6

6. See S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004) (recognizing
the end of the U.S.-led occupation in Iraq, despite the fact that United States
military troops remained in the territory and retained a substantive level of
control over the territory, ratified by an agreement with the temporary
government); Kristen E. Boon, Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours
of a Jus Post Bellum, 31 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 57, 65 (2009)
(highlighting factors that incentivize occupying forces to deny obligations);
Tristan Ferraro, Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation Under
International Humanitarian Law, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 133, 157 (2012)
(determining the end of occupation through progressive phasing out or sudden

2018]

POST-OCCUPATION OBLIGATIONS

9

The debate within the international community revolves
around the meaning of the law of belligerent occupation and
what some would argue are its inadequacies in this context. A
common critique tackles the binary legal conditions in the
existing law, which erroneously assumes the facts will always
render an easy judgment to determine if occupation law is
occurring or not.
As mentioned, today’s conflicts and occupations rarely have
a clear, negotiated ending; the various stages are now marked
by de facto processes rather than formal, legal ones. These can
include, for example, a longer process of transferring authority
and the absence of a peace agreement or any negotiated process,
often resulting in a vacuum of governance authority. Under such
circumstances, if an occupier’s duties end when the occupation
ends, the possibility remains that, for a period and perhaps
permanently, no party takes on the rights and duties of the
sovereign for providing governance, order, and provision of
essential public services to the affected population.
Various proposals have been offered and discussed by
scholars to remedy this gap by addressing the question of
whether international law imposes continuing duties upon a
former occupier with respect to a formerly occupied territory and
its civilian population. Many of them draw upon bodies of law
such as human rights law and the law of state responsibility,
which are beyond the scope of this article.7 Instead, this Article
withdrawal).
7. See id. at 89; Eyal Benvenisti, The Law on the Unilateral Termination
of Occupation (Tel Aviv Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 93, 2008),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1254523
[hereinafter,
Benvenisti,
Unilateral
Termination]; Eric De Brabandere, The Concept of Jus Post Bellum in
International Law, in JUS POST BELLUM: MAPPING THE NORMATIVE
FOUNDATIONS 123, 123–41 (Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday & Jens
Iverson eds., 2014); Yael Ronen, Post-Occupation Law, in JUS POST BELLUM:
MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 428, 428–46 (Carsten Stahn, Jennifer
S. Easterday & Jens Iverson eds., 2014); Yuval Shany, The Law Applicable to
Non-Occupied Gaza: A Comment on Bassiouni v. The Prime Minister of Israel,
42 ISR. L. REV. 101, 114–15 (2009) [hereinafter Shany, Bassiouni]; Yuval Shany,
Faraway So Close: The Legal Status of Gaza after Israel’s Disengagement, 8 Y.B.
INT’L HUM. L. 369, 369–83 (2005) [hereinafter Shany, Faraway]; Ralph Wilde,
Are Human Rights Norms Part of the Jus Post Bellum, and Should They Be?, in
JUS POST BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE
163, 163–86 (Carsten Stahn & Jann K. Kleffner eds., 2008); Boon, supra note 6,
at 76–77.
I would just briefly emphasize that it is more or less accepted among the
scholars cited here that post-occupation obligations cannot be governed
primarily by human rights law, and its application should not serve as a reason
to displace the clear and established normative framework of the law of
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focuses on the law of belligerent occupation. It argues that as a
legal matter, the law of belligerent occupation does not create an
ongoing regime of post-occupation duties of the former occupier
because it is concerned not only with civilian protection, but also
with ensuring that occupation should be a temporary condition
and not a mechanism for creeping annexation.
It seems, however, that the law of belligerent occupation
does offer certain possibilities for addressing the problem of
civilian protection through an expanded understanding of its
existing terms on coordinated transitions from the former
occupier to the returning sovereign. To fill the legal vacuum, this
Article proposes that some form of limited transitional postoccupation obligations should be triggered under certain
circumstances such as, among others, when it is known that an
end of occupation is approaching that entails a complex process
or requires a longer time period. Another trigger would occur
when the end of occupation is not concluded by a peace
agreement and where the specific circumstances indicate that
the local governing authority would not be fully restored with
the end of occupation. Thus, when the end of occupation is
approaching, and gaps appear in essential governance issues,
transitional post-occupation obligations should be limited in
time and scope and reached by negotiation and/or coordination
between the local government and the former occupying power.
Section II of this paper analyzes the law of belligerent
occupation and its legal framework to underscore the
inadequacies of the law in contemporary conflicts. Section III
explores certain weaknesses of the doctrinal, traditional
paradigm of the law of belligerent occupation, particularly with
respect to the end of occupation as it occurs in contemporary
situations, which can, in some cases, leave the territory at risk
of a vacuum in governance. Section IV illustrates that as a legal
matter, the law of belligerent occupation does not create an
ongoing regime of post-occupation duties of the former occupier.
To fill this gap, Section V aims to set a structure for the evolution
of international law in order to adapt the existing law of
occupation. The law of state responsibility, as a secondary norm, might apply
only during the occupation and transitional period as long as effective control
exists but not in its aftermath. The remedy of compensation for wrong-doing in
the past would be meaningless at the aftermath stage when the population
lacks basic infrastructure and public institutions. Ongoing provision of
essential governmental services is more relevant for the local population after
the end of occupation.
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belligerent occupation to today’s heterogeneous situations of
conflict and occupation. I consider the features of a slightly more
expansive reading of the law of belligerent occupation’s existing
transitional measures, one that might capture most
contemporary gaps by treating the post-occupation duties of
civilian protection as a “package” of the rights and duties of
governance to be transferred from departing occupier to
returning sovereign.
II. THE END OF MILITARY OCCUPATION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
The legal questions of post-occupation duties arise in part
from the answers to vital preceding questions: What constitutes
the end of occupation in a legal sense and what are its legal
consequences? In other words, can a former occupier continue,
at least in part, to exercise an occupier’s duties through the
effects of its acts, or its failures to act, even after it physically
departs the occupied territory? And who bears responsibility for
governance of a territory, or the failure to govern, at least in
terms of minimum security, public order, and services, following
the end of occupation? The legal question of what constitutes the
end of occupation thus has large and practical implications with
respect to the three basic actors in occupation law: the occupier,
the legitimate sovereign, and the local population affected by
occupation.8
Although the abstract meaning of the term “end of
occupation” might be obvious, the criteria for determining its
existence, and hence the applicability of the substantive rules of
occupation, are less than perfectly clear.9 The law of belligerent
occupation does not provide a roadmap for terminating a
military occupation. It offers neither a definition of the end of
occupation nor a criterion for when it has been reached. In the
absence of a precise definition for the termination of military
occupation, a definition of the commencement of military
occupation, as outlined in Article 42 of the 1907 Hague

8. See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Occupation and Territorial
Administration, 1–3 (Glob. Tr., Working Paper No. 11/2015, 2015) (explaining
the law of occupation and the evolution of the concept of occupation).
9. Adam Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, 55 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.
249, 249 (1984); see, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW
OF LAND WARFARE 139 (July 18, 1956) [hereinafter Army Field Manual 27-10].
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Regulations, offers a starting point for this inquiry.10
A. THE BEGINNING OF MILITARY OCCUPATION
Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations states that a
“[t]erritory is considered occupied under international law when
it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.11
“The occupation extends only to the territory where such
authority has been established and can be exercised.”12 Article
42 determines that two conditions must be fulfilled for
occupation to begin: (1) hostile troops must be physically located
in the area so that the legitimate government is incapable of
exercising effective powers of government; and (2) military
troops must be capable of exercising effective powers of
government over the occupied territory.13 The question of
whether there is a formal recognition of occupation is merely a
factual test that will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.14
According to Article 42, occupation relies on an objective
determination based on the actual submission of territory to the
authority of hostile foreign armed forces and not on a subjective
perception of the prevailing situation by the parties.15
The first condition of Article 42 to constitute occupation is a
preliminary condition for the second—i.e., the physical presence
of troops must exist before effective governmental control can be
10. Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, arts. 42–43, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter 1907
Hague Regulations]; see BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 56 (“The conditions that
define when occupation begins also identify when it ends.”); Benvenisti,
Unilateral Termination, supra note 7.
11. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 42.
12. Id.
13. Id.; see also GERHARD VON GLHAN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY
TERRITORY: A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION 28 (1957).
14. See DIETER FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 274 (2d ed. 2008); see also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 166, ¶ 173 (Dec. 19);
Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, Case No. 47, U.S. Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg, 8 LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIMS. 34, 55-56 (1948) [hereinafter
Hostage Trial]; Adam Roberts, The End of Occupation: Iraq 2004, 54 INT’L
COMP. L. Q. 27, 28 (2005); Nicholas Rostow, Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon: Three
Occupations Under International Law, 37 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 205, 217–19
(2007).
15. Tristan Ferraro, Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation
Under International Humanitarian Law, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 133, 135
(2012).
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achieved.16
As follows, the second occupation condition of Article 42 is
an examination of whether the occupying state has exercised
authority over the territory. The text is ambiguous, however,
and conflates the actual exercise of authority (“actually placed
16. Marten Zwanenburg, The Law of Occupation Revisited: The Beginning
of an Occupation, 10 Y.B INT’L HUM. L. 99, 110 (2007). In 1863, The Lieber Code
was issued to the Union Forces during the American Civil War. See FRANCIS
LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FIELD (1898). Although the Lieber Code did not contain an
explicit definition of “occupation,” it was the first legal instrument to imply that
“occupation” meant actual physical presence of military troops on a foreign
territory. Id. Physical military presence was also a condition for constituting
occupation as part of later attempts to codify the laws of war by the 1874
Brussels Declaration. Final Protocol of the Brussels Conference on the Rules of
Military Warfare, art. 1, Aug. 27, 1874, 148 C.T.S. 133. It then included the
same definition for occupation as it appears in the 1907 Hague regulations.
Compare id., with 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 42. Although the
1874 Brussels Declaration never entered into force as treaty law, it had an
important influence on later treaties that were adopted. After parties failed to
adopt the 1874 Brussels Declaration, the Institute of International Law adopted
the Oxford Manual on the Laws of Wars on Land. OXFORD MANUAL ON THE
LAWS OF WAR ON LAND (1880), reprinted in RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (James Brown Scott ed., 1916) [hereinafter OXFORD
MANUAL]. The 1880 Oxford Manual was a high-quality code that for the first
time aimed to specify the law of war and included an explicit definition of the
term “occupation.” Id. The manual contained three express requirements for the
legal existence of occupation (Article 41): (1) occupation follows the invasion of
hostile forces; (2) the state to which the territory belongs has ceased to exercise
its ordinary authority as a result of the invasion; and (3) solely the invading
state is in a position to maintain order over the occupied territory. Id. These
three conditions clarified matters considerably. Yet, the 1880 Oxford Manual’s
Article 41 was not clear on whether actual physical military presence was
required to constitute a legal state of occupation. Id. The Institute of
International Law encouraged European Governments to adopt the 1880
Oxford Manual. Id.; see also Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with
Occupation: Critical Examination of the Historical Development of the Law of
Occupation, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 51, 60, 64 (2012); VON GLHAN, supra note
13, at 9. The international legal community, however, continued to debate
whether the physical presence of troops was necessary to trigger the law of
occupation. Years later, in an attempt to revise the 1874 Brussels Declaration,
that document’s original definition of military occupation formed the basis of
discussion in The Hague International Conference. Hague Convention II
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 43, July 29, 1899, 32
Stat. 1803, 1808, 1 Bevans 247, 251 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention];
DORIS APPEL GRABER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION 1863-1914: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 30 (1949). The Second Hague
Peace Conference of 1907 adopted, as is, the wording of 1899 Hague Convention
that defined occupation. Its wording is similar to the original principles
expressed in 1874 Brussels Declaration, emphasizing that physical military
presence is an essential element for the beginning of occupation. See 1907
Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 42.
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under the authority;” “such authority has been established”)
with the potential exercise of such authority (“can be
exercised”).17 Although vaguely worded, Article 42 clearly
forbids fictitious occupations and states that the element of
control determines whether the law of occupation applies. 18
The controversy surrounding the requisite level of effective
control thus centers on two main approaches: (1) the potential
nature of foreign military troops’ presence in the occupied
territory; and (2) actual control. According to the first approach,
which is more accepted, occupation requires both actual military
presence and potential powers of government over the occupied
territory.19 The second approach is more restrictive and requires
not only the potential for an occupying state to control the
territory, but also its actual exercise of such control. In this view,

17. Marten Zwanenburg, Michael Bothe & Marco Sassoli, Is the Law of
Occupation Applicable to the Invasion Phase?, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 29, 31
(2012).
18. See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 42. Possession and
administration are the two essential facts that constitute an effective
occupation. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, VOL. 1
PEACE 557-559 (1955). Possession means that the territory must really be taken
under “its sway (corpus) with the intention of acquiring sovereignty over it
(animus).” Id. After taking possession, the possessor must establish some kind
of administration thereon that shows that the territory is really governed by
the new possessor. Id. Since an occupation is established only if effective, it is
obvious that the extent of an occupation ought to cover only so much territory
as is effectively occupied. See Hostage Trial, supra note 13, at 56; see also
MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 219 (1959); Ferraro,
supra note 15, at 139–40; VON GLHAN, supra note 13, at 28–29.
19. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
adopted the first approach and has provided some guidelines for determining
when occupation is taking place: (1) the occupying power must be in a position
to substitute its own authority for that of the authorities; (2) the enemy’s forces
must have surrendered, been defeated or withdrawn; (3) sufficient forces of the
occupying state are present in the territory or can be sent within a reasonable
time to establish authority; (4) a temporary administration has been
established over the territory; and (5) the occupying power has issued and
enforced directions to the local population. HCJ 102/82 Tsemel et. al. v. Minister
of Defence 37 (3) P.D. 365 (1983) (Isr.) (stating that the Israeli HCJ also adopted
the first approach of potential control of effective control required to constitute
occupation); Prosecutor v. Naletilic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 217 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003); U.K. MIN. OF DEF., THE
MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 273–307 (2004); CAN. OFF. OF JUDGE
ADV. GEN., JOINT DOCTRINE MANUAL: LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL §§ 1202-03 (2001); COMMENTARY TO
GENEVA CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS
IN TIME OF WAR 179 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter PICTET COMMENTARY
GC IV], http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-IV.pdf; Hostage
Trial, supra note 14, at 55–56; Army Field Man. 27-10, supra note 9, at 139.
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occupation begins only when the occupying power is actually
exercising its authority over the territory.20
When evaluating the beginning of occupation, determining
whether the territory is in a situation of occupation or mere
invasion is crucial.21 A distinction must also be made between a
situation of occupation and a blockade or military pressure.22 As
discussed, contemporary conflicts have added an additional
layer of complexity. The most meaningful development in the
20. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, VOL. 2: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
324 (1968) (arguing that the de facto element is indicative of the rule that actual
effective control is a condition sine qua non of the law of occupation). “Only
when, and where, the Occupying Power has attained unquestioned control does
hostile territory become subject to the more exacting restraints of the law of
belligerent occupation as compared with those of the laws of war in the strict
sense.” Id.; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J 166, ¶ 173 (Dec. 19) (holding that, to recognize
the existence of occupation, an actual effective control is required over the
territory and it is not sufficient to recognize a potential for such control). See,
e.g., VON GLHAN, supra note 13, at 28 (“Territory is considered occupied when
it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army . . . . Thus there is
assumed an invasion of the enemy state, resisted or unresisted, as a result of
which the invader has rendered the enemy government incapable of publicly
exercising its authority; the invader has successfully substitutes his own
authority for that of the legitimate government in the territory invaded.”).
21. The definition of occupation in Article 42 of 1907 Hague Regulations
distinguishes between “invasion” and “occupation,” although IHL does not
provide an explicit definition for the term “invasion.” 1907 Hague Regulations,
supra note 10, art. 42. Because of the unique and fluid experiences of each
situation, it can be challenging to identify the precise moment when an invasion
becomes an occupation. Id. In principle, the difference between an occupant and
invader is that an occupant establishes an administration in a territory while
an invader merely passes through the territory. Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo, (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J
166, ¶ 178 (Dec. 19); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶¶ 89–
101 (July 9); MYERS S. MCDOUGAL & F.P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION
732-35 (1961); Kenneth Watkin, Use of Force During Occupation: Law
Enforcement and Conduct of Hostilities, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 267, at 272–
73 (2012); GREENSPAN, supra note 18, at 213; Ferraro, supra note 15, at 135;
Roberts, supra note 9, at 261; OXFORD MANUAL, supra note 16, art. 41; THE
MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 19, § 11.3; Zwanenburg,
supra note 16, at 108. For the debate among international law scholars over the
distinction between invasion and occupation and whether an intermediate
phase between the two exists until effective control over the territory is reached,
see Zwanenburg, Bothe & Sassoli, supra note 17, at 29–50.
22. See Adam Roberts, Occupation, Military, Termination of, in MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL. 7 930 (2011); VON
GLHAN, supra note 13, at 29; Benvenisti, Unilateral Termination, supra note 7,
at 373.
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last few decades have been the use of air power, along with naval
power and sophisticated military technology, to impose military
pressure or blockades.23 Now it is certainly possible for a hostile
power to police a territory with minimal reliance on forces
physically present on the ground, relying instead on the use of
advanced technology in the air and sea.24 The situations of
invasion, blockade, military pressure, and belligerent occupation
vary in multiple respects, including the physical presence of
foreign military troops in foreign territory, the degree of effective
control required for their establishment, and the different
aspirations that the foreign forces hold in the specific situation.25
Yet a military air or sea presence used to impose pressure or
establish a blockade (constituting military aspirations short of
occupation that fall under the laws of armed conflict) still does
not invoke the law of belligerent occupation without the presence
of military troops on the ground.26 This kind of “hovering” or
“bordering” presence does not allow the occupying state to
physically carry out its main responsibility according to Article
43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations: to establish governmental
control to ensure and restore public order and safety for the local
population.27 The military strength of a foreign army located
23. Zwanenberg, supra note 16, at 106.
24. Eyal Benvenisti describes the situation of military power controlling air
and naval territory as “virtual occupation”—modern armies’ remotely
controlling foreign territory with advanced equipment to prevent a local
government from functioning. Cf. BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 54 (“There would
be situation where the virtual control over a foreign territory is so effective that
the local government cannot function and provide for the inhabitants. In such
cases there is a strong argument that a duty to occupy arise, the virtual
occupant having to send in ground troops to establish the necessary
infrastructure to restore and ensure public order and secure the human rights
of the inhabitants.”); see Ferraro, supra note 15, at 143; Zwanenburg, supra note
16, at 106, 126.
25. Cf. Benjamin Rubin, Disengagement from the Gaza Strip and PostOccupation Duties, 42 ISR. L. REV. 528, 538 (2009); SCHWARZENBERGER, supra
note 20, at 177; Zwanenburg, supra note 16, at 130.
26. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION 48 (2009); Hans-Peter Gasser, Belligerent Occupation, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW para. 527 (D. Fleck ed., 2d
ed. 2008); VON GLHAN, supra note 13, at 28–29; Ferraro, supra note 15, at 145.
27. See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 42–56. The recognition
of an occupation holds vital implications for the occupying state according to the
ensuing duties assigned by the law of belligerent occupation. The 1907 Hague
Regulations determine the rights of occupying powers in the conduct of
operations and limit the means of doing harm that is not compatible with
military necessity. The Fourth Geneva Convention safeguards military
personnel placed “hors de combat,” as well as people not taking part in
hostilities. For the main duties of the occupying power, see id.; Additional
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outside the borders of a state or area is not in itself sufficient to
constitute effective control. What matters is a foreign power’s
ability to establish effective control over civilian life within the
occupied area and its capability of substituting its authority for
that of the local government.28
B. THE END OF MILITARY OCCUPATION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
As discussed, given the lack of a legal definition of
belligerent occupation, the end of an occupation can be
understood as the reversal or unwinding of its commencement.29
That is, the termination of a military occupation is a reversal of
the situation that constituted a military occupation of a
sovereign state or territory in the first place, or a reversion to
what existed before the occupation. Therefore, the common legal
assumption is that an occupation ends when the elements
essential for the commencement (and duration) of one—
including the physical presence of foreign forces, their ability to
exercise effective control, and the lack of local government
consent to their presence—cease to exist.30
As complex as it is to answer the question of when a territory
is considered occupied, it is even more complex to determine the
end of occupation based on its beginning. The determination of
whether effective control has been transferred or lost must be
considered on a case-by-case basis.31 In many cases, however,

Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter AP1]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 27–34, 47–
78, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].
28. Council Decision 2008/901/CFSP of Dec. 2, 2008, Concerning an
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia,
2008 O.J. (L 323/66); SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 174; VON GLHAN,
supra note 13, at 28. See also ROBERT KOLB & SYLVAIN VITÉ, LE DROIT DE
L’OCCUPATION MILITAIRE: PERSPECTIVES HISTORIQUES ET ENJEUX JURIDIQUES
ACTUELS 143, 149 (2009); Kenneth Watkin, Use of Force During Occupation:
Law Enforcement and Conduct of Hostilities, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 267, 299
(2012); MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 21, at 732–35; Benvenisti, supra
note 8, at 6; Roberts, supra note 9, at 300.
29. Shany, Faraway, supra note 7, at 359; Ferraro, supra note 15, at 156.
30. Id. at 156.
31. Benvenisti, Unilateral Termination, supra note 7, at 375–76.
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the lapse of time between the cessation of fighting and the
signing of an agreement ending the war blurs the precise point
in time when occupation responsibilities commence and
terminate.32 As discussed earlier, since establishing the Hague
Regulations, some conditions, such as progressive phasing out,
partial withdrawal, continued military presence on the basis of
consent between the occupying power and the local government,
maintenance of certain competences over the previously
occupied area, or the evolution of the means of exercising
effective control can complicate the legal classification of when
an occupation has ended and duties are removed.33
In general and straightforward circumstances, an
occupation would be terminated at the actual dispossession of
the territory (or part of it) by the occupying power, regardless
the cause of the dispossession.34 According to scholars and
international law bodies, the two widely accepted elements for
defining the end of occupation are (1) the withdrawal of military
forces from the territory; and (2) the loss of effective control over
a territory or its transfer to a local power—that is, a legitimate
government among the local population that is able to resume
its authority and functions.35 Drawing solely on the various
army manuals, it is difficult to elucidate any further common or
consistent criteria for the end of an occupation beyond the
elements already discussed in Article 42 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations.36 The International Review of the Red Cross on
32. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET. NO. 27-161-2, INT’L L. V. II, 159–
61 (1962).
33. Ferraro, supra note 15, at 134.
34. VON GLHAN, supra note 13, at 29.
35. LASSA FRANCIS OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, VOL. 2
DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY 436 (1952); DINSTEIN, supra note 26, at 272;
GREENSPAN, supra note 17, at 219. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at
317; Roberts, supra note 14, at 27.
36. It is accepted that military manuals might be valid evidence for state
practice and might represent opinion juris, which would make them customary
international law. But see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (5th ed. 1998). For the opposite opinion that military
manuals are not necessarily an evidence of customary international law, see
Nobou Hayashi, National Military Manuals on the Law of Armed Conflict,
FICHL PUBLICATIONS SERIES NO. 2 1, 65 (2d ed. 2010), http://www.fichl.org/
fileadmin/fichl/documents/FICHL_2_Second_Edition_web.pdf. The French
Army Manual does not include any specification regarding the end of
occupation; it simply repeats the principles of Article 42 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations for the constituting occupation. FR. MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE,
MANUAL DE DROIT DES CONFLIT ARMÉS (2012), http://www.cicde.defense.
gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/20130226_np_cicde_manuel-dca.pdf. The German Army
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Customary Law also fails to indicate any specific guidelines for
the end of occupation.37
Military withdrawal is a preliminary condition for clearly
identifying the end of occupation, and much emphasis has been
placed on it by international law bodies and in legal writing.38
Just as occupation cannot begin without the presence of a hostile
army, military withdrawal necessarily indicates that occupation
has ended.39 This was, in fact, the recent decision of the
Manual, although it emphasizes that “[o]ccupied territory does not include
battle areas, i.e. areas which are still embattled and not subject to permanent
occupational authority (area of invasion, withdrawal area). The general rules of
international humanitarian law shall be applicable here.” GER. FEDERAL
MINISTER OF DEFENCE, HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT – MANUAL ¶
528 (1992). The U.S. Army Manual also does not include explicit reference to
the end of occupation but just emphasizes that: “Occupation = Invasion + Firm
Control. The radius of occupation is determined by the effectiveness of control;
occupation must be actual and effective.” U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT DESKBOOK III 122 (2012). Both the Canadian Army Manual and the
Australian Army Manual include an explicit section for “termination of
occupation” and detail the three ways occupation might end: (1) withdrawal
from the territory; (2) ejection by force of the occupying power; and
(3) annexation by the occupying power. The Australian Military Manual adds
that valid legal annexation cannot occur while allies of the defeated sovereign
nation are still in the field against the occupying power. OFFICE OF THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, JOINT DOCTRINE MANUAL, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT
THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS, B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, § 2, art. 1204
(Aug. 13, 2001) (Can.); AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
§ 12.9 (2006). The United Kingdom’s military manual repeats the elements of
military withdrawal and loss of effective control required for the end of
occupation and elaborates: “11.7.1 The fact that some of the inhabitants are in
a state of rebellion, or that guerrillas or resistance fighters have occasional
successes, does not render the occupation at an end. Even a temporarily
successful rebellion in part of the area under occupation does not necessarily
terminate the occupation so long as the occupying power takes steps to deal
with the rebellion and re-establish its authority or the area in question is
surrounded and cut off. Whether or not a rebel movement has successfully
terminated an occupation is a question of fact and degree depending on, for
example, the extent of the area controlled by the movement and the length of time
involved, the intensity of operations, and the extent to which the movement is
internationally recognized.” UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JSP 383 THE JOINT
SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 11.7.1 (2004) (emphasis
added).
37. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International
Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the
Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175 (2005); Roberts,
supra note 22, § 54, at 9.
38. VON GLHAN, supra note 13, at 29; Roberts, supra note 22, § 20, at 4.
39. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 562–63. Discussing the consequences of
occupation, Oppenheim states that no other state can acquire an occupied
territory unless the occupying power withdraws from it or has been successfully
driven away by the local government without being able to re-occupy. This
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European Court of Human Rights in its ruling on two cases
regarding the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Court held that the
physical presence of foreign troops is a sine qua non requirement
of occupation and that military occupation is inconceivable
without “boots on the ground.”40
The second indication that the law of occupation ceases to
apply is the loss of effective control.41 A fair legal ramification of
the end of occupation is when an occupying power loses effective
control, local authority over the occupied territory will be
restored, even if it is not restored fully.42 Yet in these situations
it is equally unclear what level of effective control needs to be
transferred to constitute the end of occupation. This is the “weak
point” of the law of belligerent occupation, compounding the
difficulties established by the lack of definition or standards for
ending occupation.
There are various ways to end an occupation, and military
withdrawal and transfer of effective control can take different
forms.43 The legal principle of the law of belligerent occupation
assumes that the end of occupation is agreed-upon and includes
a political arrangement or declaration, international treaties,
international bodies’ resolutions, or political leaders’ statements
that set the terms for military withdrawal and transfer of control
to the local sovereign.44 All would normally include provisions
regarding the form of local government in the territory, any
security arrangements, commitments according to international
treaties, and economic and cultural relations with other states
taking part in the arrangement.45
There are other ways of ending occupation, however, that do
not involve the coordination of military withdrawal and transfer
argument indicates that the existence of occupation, or vice versa—
termination—depends upon the physical presence of military forces or their
withdrawal. Id.
40. Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 40167/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 28–29 (2015);
Chiragov and Others v. Armenia, App. No. 13216/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 33–35
(2015).
41. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 317.
42. YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND ITS INTERACTION WITH
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 16 (2009); Benvenisti, Unilateral
Termination, supra note 7, at 371.
43. Roberts, supra note 22, § 20, at 4.
44. Id.
45. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 172; Roberts, supra note 22, § 19,
at 4.
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of effective control. For example, the ousted local government
might reinstate control over the territory by its legitimate armed
forces or its allies in the area; the local population might set the
territory free through uprisings and ultimately establish its own
local government; the occupying power might take unilateral
steps; or the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council (U.N.
Security Council) might issue a binding resolution.46
The varied ways of ending an occupation bring forward a
customary principle in international law that occupation should
be terminated based on consent of the states involved,
international norms and institutions, and the legitimacy of the
local population.47 Annexation is illegal according to customary
international law; in this scenario there is a customary
obligation to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to end any
occupation.48
In situations where occupations end, state practice has been
far from uniform; it can hardly fill in the blanks where legal
instruments fail to set clear rules for cases where the end of
occupation is not a defined, clear-cut moment concluded by peace
agreement or treaty. For example, there are circumstances in
which an occupation is widely accepted as terminated despite
the fact that the intervening force remains in the territory, as
with the United States military’s occupation of Japan and the
end of the Allied occupation of West Germany.49 In these cases,
46. ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 42, at 150–51; Benvenisti, Unilateral
Termination, supra note 7, at 371; Roberts, supra note 22, § 18, at 4; VON
GLHAN, supra note 13, at 257.
47. Roberts, supra note 22, § 55, at 9–10.
48. Id.
49. Roberts, supra note 14, at 29; Security Treaty, Japan-U.S., art. 6(a),
Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3329 (“All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be
withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the
present Treaty, and in any case not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in
this provision shall, however, prevent the stationing or retention of foreign
armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or
multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more
of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other.”). With regards
to the allied occupation of West Germany, the original text of the Paris
Agreements, in particular Protocol I, states that occupation ended while allied
forces remained in the territory. Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation
Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany (with Schedule of amendments),
Oct. 23, 1954, 331 U.N.T.S. 253; Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect
to Germany with Agreed Minute, art. 7, Sept. 20, 1990, 1696 U.N.T.S. 115 (“(1)
The French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
America hereby terminate their rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin
and to Germany as a whole. As a result, the corresponding, related
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foreign forces remained in the territory after occupation’s end
with the consent of local government and as a result of an
agreement between the parties.50 In 2004, the U.N. Security
Council recognized the end of the United States-led occupation
of Iraq despite the fact that military troops remained in the
territory of Iraq until 2011, retaining a substantive level of
control over the territory.51 The continued presence of the
occupying powers in Iraq after the stated end of occupation was
not accompanied by a security treaty, as was the case in
Germany and Japan post World War II.52
The case of Afghanistan is another example of military
troops remaining in a former occupied territory, although in this
case the occupation was never formally recognized and the law

quadripartite agreements, decisions and practices are terminated and all
related Four Power institutions are dissolved. (2) The United Germany shall
have accordingly full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs.”);
Roberts, supra note 14, at 29.
50. DINSTEIN, supra note 26, at 270; Benvenisti, Unilateral Termination,
supra note 7, at 371-82.
51. The presence of United States-led forces after the end of occupation was
ratified by an agreement with the local temporary government. Although the
presence of military troops in Iraq lasted nine years after the Security Council
adopted a resolution declaring the end of United States-led forces occupation of
Iraq, and the United States-led forces military presence was based on the
explicit consent of the local Iraqi government and on particular agreements, it
remains true that the United States-led coalition retained significant effective
control and was highly involved in combat operations. It was possible because
the Security Council Resolution recognized the end of occupation in Iraq and
consequently the application of the law of belligerent occupation and authorized
the ongoing presence of United States-led forces in territory. Not only did the
occupying powers in Iraq retain external security control after the conclusion of
occupation, as in the case of Japan and Germany, but also they also retained
administrative and internal security authorities. See S.C. Res. 1546 (June 8,
2004) (“Welcoming the beginning of a new phase in Iraq’s transition to a
democratically elected government, and looking forward to the end of the
occupation and the assumption of full responsibility and authority by a fully
sovereign and independent Interim Government of Iraq by 30 June 2004.”). See
also ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 42, at 20; DINSTEIN, supra note 26, at 273.
52. Agreement On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and
the Organization of Their Activities During Their Temporary Presence in Iraq,
Iraq-U.S.,
Nov.
17,
2008,
T.I.A.S.
No.
09-101.1
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122074.pdf (stating that the
Iraq-U.S. agreement was reached years after the stated end of occupation);
Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and
Cooperation, Iraq-U.S., Nov. 17, 2008, T.I.A.S. No. 09-101.1, http://www.usfiraq.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/security-agreement-2.pdf.
See
also
Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and
Friendship, Iraq-U.S., Aug. 27, 2007 (no longer in force), http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/11/print/20071126-11.html.
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of belligerent occupation did not technically apply.53 Following
the end of the unrecognized occupation, foreign troops continue
to exercise some effective control similar to the control exercised
during occupation to stabilize the country’s regime and run
counter-insurgency operations (including policing functions).54
Their stay, however, is acceptable to the legitimate local
government, and the foreign presence is therefore no longer
considered to be akin to an occupying power with obligations
according to the law of belligerent occupation. The pertinent
question is whether the consent between the parties to the
ongoing presence of the former occupying power in the territory
would negate the requirements of the law of belligerent
occupation, if occupation had been formally declared.55
State practice was also notably inconsistent in the case of
the unilateral action taken by Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in
53. United States-led forces launched campaigns against the Taliban
regime starting on October 6, 2001, and lasting throughout the occupation of
Afghanistan. There is no consensus among legal authorities as to when exactly
this occupation ended. The view of the ICRC was that the occupation of United
States-led forces ended with the establishment of the Afghan transitional
government in June 19, 2002. International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism:
Questions and Answers, ICRC (Jan. 1, 2011), https://www.icrc.org/eng/
resources/documents/faq/terrorism-faq-050504.htm. For legal analysis of the
Afghanistan conflict, see ELIZABETH WILMSHURST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 242-79 (2012); A. Bellal, G. Giacca & S.
Casey-Maslen, International Law and Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan,
93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 52 (2011).
54. S.C. Res. 1510, art. 1 (Oct. 13, 2003) (“Authorizes expansion of the
mandate of the International Security Assistance Force to allow it, as resources
permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the
maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its
environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United
Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in
reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment,
and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support
of the Bonn Agreement.”). S.C Res. 1386, art. 1 (Dec. 20, 2001) (“Authorizes, as
envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for 6 months
of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim
Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas,
so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United
Nations can operate in a secure environment.”). See also Enduring Strategic
Partnership Agreement, Afg.-U.S., May 2, 2012, T.I.A.S. No. 12-704,
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/196855.pdf.; President, George
W. Bush, The President’s News Conference With President Hamid Karzai of
Afghanistan (May 23, 2005), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
php?pid=73643; Mark Landler, U.S. Troops to Leave Afghanistan by the End of
2016, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/
world/asia/us-to-complete-afghan-pullout-by-end-of-2016-obama-to-say.html.
55. Roberts, supra note 22, § 27, at 5.
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2005, which involved the evacuation of all Israeli settlements
and military forces from the territory without coordination with
the local government and the international community.56 In the
56. On June 6, 2004, Israel’s Cabinet adopted a resolution regarding the
Disengagement Plan from Gaza and the northern West Bank. As to Gaza, the
Cabinet’s decision was as follows:
1) The State of Israel will evacuate the Gaza Strip, including all
existing Israeli towns and villages, and will redeploy outside the Strip.
This will not include military deployment in the area of the border
between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (“the Philadelphi Route”) as
detailed below.
2) Upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any
permanent presence of Israeli security forces in the areas of Gaza Strip
territory which have been evacuated.
Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan art. 3.1, June 6, 2004,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/mfadocuments/pages/revised%2
0disengagement%20plan%206-june-2004.aspx.
On September 12, 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza and evacuated
all Israeli settlements within Gaza while retaining control over the air, sea, and
land passages of persons and goods into Gaza from Israel. Following the
withdrawal of all military forces, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) commander
in Gaza signed a declaration terminating the military administration
operations in the territory. Manifest Regarding Termination of Military Rule
(Manifest No. 6) (Gaza Region) 5765-2005. See also Press Release, IDF
Spokesman, Exit of IDF Forces from the Gaza Strip Completed, (Sept. 12, 2005),
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2005/pages/exit%20of%20idf%20forces%
20from%20the%20gaza%20strip%20completed%2012-sep-2005.aspx (“Tonight,
September 12, 2005 the Head of the Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Dan Harel
signed a declaration stating the end of military rule in the Gaza Strip. This
follows the evacuation of all IDF forces from the region and the handing over of
control of the region to the Palestinian Authority; in accordance with the
decision of the Israeli Government. This declaration annuls the declaration
signed June 6, 1967 by the former Head of the Southern Command, Maj. Gen.
Yishayahu Gavish declaring the start of military rule in the area. This is the
final legislative act taken by an IDF commander in the Gaza Strip after 38 years
of IDF presence in the region.”). In an attempt to achieve international
recognition for the end of its responsibility, Israel surrendered its complete
control over Gaza by signing the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA)
with the Palestinian Authority (PA). Agreement On Movement and Access and
Agreed Principles for the Rafah Crossing, Isr.-P.A., Nov. 17, 2005,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/2005/87237.htm.
In June 2007, Hamas gained control over Gaza and since then has operated all
governmental authorities in the area. For Israel’s official standpoint that its
effective control over Gaza ended after its 2005 withdrawal, see TURKEL
COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE PUBLIC COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE MARITIME
INCIDENT OF 31 MAY 2010 28 (2010), http://www.turkel-committee.com/files/
wordocs//8707200211english.pdf.
For the international community’s standpoint that Israel remains an occupying
power in Gaza despite the 2005 disengagement, see, e.g., Office of the Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Situation on Registered Vessels of
Comoros, Greece and Cambodia: Article 53(1) Report, ¶ 16 (Nov. 6, 2016); S.C.
Res. 1860 (Jan. 8, 2009); Human Rights Council, Rep. of the United Nations
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absence of coordination, and without any practice or standards
that would encourage such coordination, the end of occupation
was not formally recognized. That does not mean, however, that
Israel continues to or even has the practical ability to carry out
duties according to the law of belligerent occupation, mainly
because it has no military troops on the ground, and the local
government has been exercising governmental control since
1993.57 However, since Hamas took over governmental authority
in the Gaza Strip in 2007, the result is that the territory has
been left in some aspects without responsible formal power;
while Israel no longer performs duties according the law of
belligerent occupation, the local government is unwilling to
independently maintain all necessary governmental authorities
for the local population.58
The international community and the U.N. play a major role
in setting principles and recognizing the end of an occupation
when the terms are not finalized in a peace agreement or
treaty.59 Unfortunately, in many historical cases, the U.N.
refrained from recognizing occupations in the first place and left
the events unanswered.60 As mentioned, only two cases exist
where the law of belligerent occupation was invoked and
Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict: Human Rights in Palestine and
Other Occupied Arab Territories on Its Twelfth Session, ¶ 276, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/12/48 (Sep. 25, 2009); John Dugard (Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights), Question of the Violation of Human Rights
(Either All Lower or All Upper) in the Occupied Territories, Including Palestine,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/29 (Jan. 17, 2006).
For the debate on the legal status of Gaza among international scholars since
Israel’s withdrawal in 2005, see Robert A. Caplen, Rules of “Disengagement”:
Relating the Establishment of Palestinian Gaza to Israel’s Right to Exercise SelfDefense as Interpreted by the International Court of Justice at Hague, 18 FLA. J.
INT’L L. 679 (2006); Elizabeth Samson, Is Gaza Occupied?: Redefining the Status
of Gaza Under International Law, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 915 (2010);
BENVENISTI, supra note 2; Shany, Faraway, supra note 7; Rostow, supra note
14.
57. HCJ 9132/07 Gaber Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister. ¶¶ 12–15 (2008)
(Isr.) (unpublished), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/07/320/091320.n25.htm.
58. Id.
59. See e.g., Ending occupation only way to lay foundations for lasting
Israeli-Palesteinian peace – UN officials, UN NEWS CENTRE (June 29, 2017),
https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=57087#.WgfKVmhSw2w
(giving an example of the UN playing a role in an attempt to recognize the end
of an occupation).
60. FLECK, supra note 14, at 276. For example, the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan from 1979-1989; the United States invasion and occupation of
Grenada in 1983 and of Panama in 1989; and the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in
1991 were all unrecognized by the U.N. Id.
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adhered to by an occupying state: the Coalition forces’ presence
in Iraq in 2003 and Israel’s in Gaza and the West Bank since
1967.61
The current case of Cyprus and Turkey presents a relevant
example for the role the international community plays in
setting principles for occupation and its end. In general,
Turkey’s long-term occupation of Northern Cyprus and its
accordance with international law have attracted little attention
from the international community.62 During the first years of the
occupation, only non-binding U.N. General Assembly resolutions
called for respect of the right of refugees to return and to
repossess the property they owned.63 After a number of failed
attempts, the Secretary General appointed a Special Adviser on
Cyprus in 2014 to assist the parties in the conduct of
negotiations aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement.64
Since 2014, however, no major negotiation efforts have been
taken and the occupation is still unresolved.
Russia’s activities in Georgia and Crimea also explicate the
inconsistent treatment of occupations versus territorial
annexations by the U.N. and the international community. In
2008, Russia occupied significant undisputed areas in Georgia
as part of the conflict over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, creating
a buffer zone under the full control of its forces.65 None of the
U.N. bodies have recognized the situation as either annexation
or occupation, despite the fact that the Parliamentary Assembly
of the European Union and the European Union Independent
International Fact Finding Mission did.66 According to Russia,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not occupied territories but
independent states.67 However, no international or domestic
61. BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 9, 203.
62. S.C. Res. 360 (Aug. 16, 1974).
63. BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 306.
64. S.C. Res. 774 (Aug. 25, 1992); S.C. Res. 1475 (Apr. 14, 2003); Press
Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Appoints Espen Barth Eide of
Norway as Special Adviser on Cyprus, U.N. Press Release SG/A/1498 (Aug. 22,
2014).
65. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ. Fed.), Order on Provisional Measures,
2008 I.C.J. 353 (Oct. 15).
66. Eur. Parl. Ass., The consequences of the war between Georgia and
Russia, Res. 1633 (2008), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTM
L-EN.asp?fileid=17681&lang=en; Council Decision 2008/901/CFSP, 2008 O.J. L
323/66 (EU), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ac45cd22.html; WILMSHURST,
supra note 53, at 318–26.
67. See Philip P. Pan & Jonathan Finer, Russia Says 2 Regions in Georgia
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legal act can justify the Russian military invasion of the
sovereign territory of Georgia, or the recognition of the selfproclaimed independence of Georgian separatist regions by
Russia.68 It is obvious that Russia intends to annex these
territories—an illegal act according to international law that
should be treated accordingly by the international community.69
In 2014, Russia also occupied Crimea in an attempt to effect
annexation. Following the occupation, Crimea and Sevastopol
held referenda on the question of whether to join the Russian
Federation, yet it was widely suspected that these referenda
were conducted not by locals, but by pro-Russian authorities.70
To date, only Russia and four other U.N. members—
Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Syria—have
recognized the validity of the referenda.71 The General Assembly
adopted a non-binding resolution considering the referenda as
non-binding and reaffirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity.72
However, until very recently, neither the U.N. nor the
international community had recognized Russia as an occupying
state in Crimea.73 On December 19, 2016, the U.N. General
Assembly passed a resolution that declared Russia an
“occupying power” in Crimea and recognized Crimea as
“temporarily occupied” by Russia.74
The varied reactions of the international community to
these events reveal the inconsistency in its own standards with
respect to ending occupation. Such inconsistency reflects the
political interests and aspirations behind each case, rather than
Are Independent, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/26/AR2008082600996.html.
68. LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, RUSSIAN FEDERATION: LEGAL ASPECTS OF
WAR IN GEORGIA (Sept. 2008), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-aspects-of-war/
russia-legal-aspects-of-war.pdf.
69. Id.; Russia-Proposed Treaty with Abkhazia on ‘Alliance and
Integration’, C IVIL.GE (Oct. 13, 2014, 11:39 PM), http://civil.ge/eng/article.
php?id=27714.
70. David Adesnik, How Russia Rigged Crimean Referendum, FORBES,
(Mar. 18, 2014, 09:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidadesnik/2014/03/
18/how-russia-rigged-crimean-referendum/#4c2fd4b46d41.
71. Jeremy Bender, These are the 6 Countries on Board with Russia’s Illegal
Annexation of Crimea, BUSINESS INSIDER- DEUTSCHLAND, (May, 31, 2016, 6:16
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.de/six-countries-okay-with-russias-annexa
tion-of-crimea-2016-5?r=US&IR=T.
72. G.A. Res. 68/262 (Mar. 27, 2014); Roberts, supra note 22, § 43, at 8.
73. In 2015, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution that reaffirms
the full respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of
Ukraine. See S.C. Res. 2202 (Feb. 17, 2015).
74. G.A. Res. 71/205 (Dec. 19, 2016).
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the exercise of measured, pragmatic treatment according to
coherent legal standards.
III.

WEAKNESSES OF THE TRADITIONAL LEGAL
PARADIGM OF THE END OF OCCUPATION

A. THE LEGAL PARADIGM OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION
As mentioned, it is well established in the law of occupation
that the transition from belligerent occupation to territorial
sovereignty regained must be considered with respect to three
different actors: the departing occupier, the returning legitimate
sovereign, and the affected civilian population.75 It is also
accepted that when occupation begins and the occupying power
is subject to the rules of the law of belligerent occupation, it acts
under two fundamental legal principles that have been in effect
since the 19th century.76 The first is the protection of the
occupied civilian population by, inter alia, ensuring and
restoring its public order, security, and essential needs as much
as possible.77 This first principle of civilian protection has been
grounded in international humanitarian law ever since the
adoption of the Preamble of the 1899 Hague Regulations. This
Article, commonly called The Martens Clause, states that
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) protects civilians and
belligerents, even in situations arising from armed conflict that
were not anticipated by specific treaty provisions.78 Since the
initial adoption of the 1899 Hague Regulations, the wording of
the preamble has appeared in every major humanitarian treaty,
including the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva
Convention.79 This clause was defined by the Nuremburg Trials
75. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 346.
76. Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 16.
77. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 16, pmbl.
78. 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 16, pmbl (“Until a more complete
code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to
declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them,
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages established
between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of
the public conscience.”).
79. AP1, supra note 27, art. 1(2); 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 16,
pmbl; Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict,
317 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 125, 125–26 (1997).
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as the “legal yardstick” that every military act not governed by
specific provisions must be judged upon.80 In its Advisory
Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that the Marten
Clause protects civilian populations, emphasizing its relevancy
as an integral part of IHL, regardless of subsequent
developments in military technology.81
The second principle that the occupying power is subject to
under the law of occupation is ensuring the “temporary” nature
of occupation. The means, governance by the occupying state is
colored by the expectation of the eventual return of the
legitimate (even if temporarily ousted) sovereign to its
preexisting right and responsibilities of governance of the
occupied territory and its civilian population.82 This second
principle that occupation is a time-limited state of affairs, not
amounting to sovereignty and pending a peace agreement, is
exemplified in the law of belligerent occupation by three aspects:
(1) the prohibition of annexation, firmly established in the
customary law;83 (2) rules regarding the occupier’s structure of
authority during occupation;84 and (3) rules regarding the
maintenance of existing legislation in the occupied territory.85
Whatever the driving force, the rules governing the end of
occupation (postliminium) signal restoration of the legal status
quo before the belligerent occupation (as opposed to uti
possidetis, which signifies the maintenance of the status quo).86
Postliminium
means
that
the
legitimate
sovereign
automatically reassumes full authority and responsibility for the
former occupied territory with the termination of its
occupation.87 From the point of view of the occupying power, an
alternate meaning of the end of occupation according to the IHL
paradigm is that the occupying state’s responsibilities are
80. Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity and
Dictates of Public Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 78, 79–80 (2000).
81. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8).
82. BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 76; Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 1–2;
FLECK, supra note 14, at 273; GRABER, supra note 16, at 43–47.
83. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 19, at 172.
84. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, arts. 53–55.
85. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 43; Adam Roberts,
Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human
Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580, 584 (2006).
86. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 317.
87. GREENSPAN, supra note 18, at 605.
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automatically alleviated.88 The law of occupation assumes that
this is a defined moment when full compatibility exists between
the transfer of effective control from the occupying power to the
local, legitimate sovereign and reversion to the latter’s rights
and obligations of sovereignty. One withdraws from governance,
and the other enters to carry it forward.
The cleanest situation of this “handover” is when occupation
and the conflict come to an end simultaneously through a peace
agreement or similar instrument. However, even under the
traditional law of occupation, occupations often come to end in
the midst of an armed conflict that continues apace. German
forces occupying parts of France in World War II, for example,
were forced to withdraw as part of a general retreat that was far
from the end of the war itself.89 The general paradigm of the law
of occupation, even in cases where the conflict itself does not end,
is that the withdrawal of the enemy’s occupying forces provides
the opening for the legitimate sovereign to return and take up
its rights and obligations of sovereignty.
B. PARADIGMATIC WEAKNESSES OF THE LAW OF
BELLIGERENT IN CONTEMPORARY SITUATIONS OF
OCCUPATION
While the binary model of the law of belligerent occupation
has the merit of clarity with respect to sovereignty and
governance, it nonetheless has at least three weaknesses from
the standpoint of the fundamental policies underlying it. The
first is the concept of “effective control” in occupation. Effective
control is defined as the ability of the occupier to exercise
governmental control, stepping into the shoes of the ousted
sovereign for a limited time period.90 The presence of hostile
troops in the territory is essential. For example, in a world where
the ability to remotely, “constructively occupy” a territory
through advanced technology exists, such “occupation” is still
merely influencing the government and does not constitute true
effective control. The ambiguous language that allows legal
analysis to view effective control as a separate element from
military presence on the ground in determining occupation

88. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 317.
89. See, e.g., 1944 Liberation of Paris, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/
this-day-in-history/liberation-of-paris (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
90. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, arts. 42–43.
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neglects its core, intended meaning.91
The binary approach to occupation, whether beginning or
end, admirably respects sovereignty and governance of the
legitimate sovereign through the principle of temporality. But,
this approach causes one to view occupation in a vacuum. A
second weakness is manifested in how the possibility that the
inability or unwillingness of the legitimate sovereign to take
over the functions of governance (particularly when the occupier
has withdrawn and given up its rights and obligations as
occupier) is left open, exposing the civilian population to
humanitarian or other risks. The binary model of the law of
occupation, in other words, assumes a sovereign that is able and
willing (after, perhaps, some negotiated period of transition and
handover) to revert to its rights and obligations of governance.
This may not always be the case, and if so, the civilian
population can find itself at risk through a vacuum of
governance authority.
The third weakness emerges in the many contemporary
conflict and end-of-occupation scenarios that simply do not fit
this tidy binary model.92 These include situations of civil war or
strife occurring alongside the conflict that led to occupation;
situations in which no one admits to being either the occupier or,
in some conditions, an “ousted” legitimate sovereign, and, hence,
no party admits to any obligations toward the civilian
population; situations of humanitarian intervention or the
“responsibility to protect;” or situations in which an
international body (i.e., the U.N. Security Council) has endorsed
armed intervention resulting not merely in a new
administration invested with the country’s sovereignty, but a
fundamental change in the nature of governance.93 In this final
91. Id.; BENVENISTI, supra note 2; Zwanenburg, supra note 16, at 106, 126.
92. “Contemporary Conflict” is often used to refer to the prevailing pattern
of political and violent conflicts at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Particularly, contemporary armed conflicts refer only to those that involve the
use of force. See, e.g., OLIVER RAMSBOTHAM, TOM WOODHOUSE & HUGH MIALL,
CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND
TRANSFORMATION OF DEADLY CONFLICT 29 (2d ed. 2005). Contemporary
occupations in this context refer to conflicts and occupations (acknowledged or
not) that share features with, yet remain different from, those covered by the
traditional law of belligerent occupation.
93. In some cases, the objective of the occupation is not to fight another
state, but to fight non-state actors acting within states located far away from
the occupying power that are considered as a security threat to one, or perhaps
many, states (i.e. Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Hezbollah in Southern
Lebanon). The objective might sometimes be to install a new government as a
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case, what began as an “occupation” under the law of belligerent
occupation could be successively transformed into a quasitrusteeship under the blessing of international organizations,
eventually enabling the establishment of a fully recognized
sovereign. In this scenario, any remaining foreign forces are
present by sovereign consent.
When the traditional law of occupation was first conceived,
occupations were a hostile army’s strategic tool in the quest for
victory. Belligerent occupation was not—and is not today,
despite a greater emphasis on civilian protection—a neutral
institution designed to create a zone of stability to protect
civilians.94 As such, control of territory is legally permitted
through the presence of a hostile state’s troops, for reasons of
military necessity.95 The occupying state is allowed to privilege
its military security needs while protecting the local population
and the territory’s (ultimate) sovereignty as much as possible.96
In other words, the rules of belligerent occupation remain the
same. The strategic goal of many (though not necessarily all)
contemporary occupations, by contrast, is not to gain territory,
whether for reasons of outright conquest or as a matter of
military necessity. In some cases, the objective of the occupation
is not to fight another state, but to fight non-state actors acting
within states located far away from the occupying power that are
considered a security threat to one or more states (e.g. Taliban
and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Hezbollah in Southern
Lebanon).97
means to end or prevent mass atrocities and human rights abuses, as was the
case in Libya. It might sometimes take place under the authority of the Security
Council (e.g., East Timor), under the authority of a regional security alliance
(e.g., NATO in Kosovo), or it might take place unilaterally (the United States
invasion of Iraq).
94. Benvensiti argues that since the adoption of the Fourth Geneva
Convention (focusing on individuals rather than governments, and
encompassing occupations that “m[et] no armed resistance”), an occupation’s
regime does not depend on the existence of a formal state of war or on the armed
resistance to the occupant. Therefore, in his view, the scope of the law must
extend beyond the confines of war and the proper definition of occupation is “a
situation where the forces of one or more states - including peace-keeping forces
or forces of international organizations—exercise effective control over a
territory of another state without the sovereign’s volition.” See BENVENISTI,
supra note 2, at 80; Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 2.
95. 1907 Hague Regulation, supra note 10, arts. 42–43.
96. Id.
97. See Timeline: US Intervention in Afghanistan 2001 to 2017, AL
JAZEERA,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/2001-2017-interventionafghanistan-170822035036797.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2017); see also 2006:
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In other circumstances, the objective of military action
leading to occupation by foreign forces is to end a regime by
installing a new government as a means to end or prevent mass
atrocities and human rights abuses, as was the case of the 2011
intervention in Libya.98 Occupation may aim to prevent crimes
against humanity, genocide, or mass atrocities and ethnic
cleansing, by separating a territory from the security control of
the central government, as with North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO)’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo.99 Such
action may take place under the authority of the U.N. Security
Council (e.g., East Timor), under the authority of a regional
security alliance (e.g., NATO in Kosovo), or it may take place
unilaterally, as with the United States invasion of Iraq in
2003.100 Military action could also take the form of an invasion
and occupation of sovereign territory by foreign forces on the
grounds of protecting an ethnic minority that is the same as the
invading state’s ethnicity, or to protect the “self-determination”
of such an ethnic or linguistic minority. These justifications were
offered by Russia for its entry into Crimea in 2014, even as it
also denied that its forces were in fact present in the conflict, let
alone enacting an “occupation.”101
In characterizing the main features of contemporary
conflicts that do not fit the legal paradigm of the end of military
occupation, it can be stressed that these are situations where
ending occupation is a process and not a specific moment, and/or
situations where peace or the end of conflict is not the obvious
precondition to, or consequence of, the end of occupation.
These contemporary situations matter to the analysis of
occupation law because most (if not all) of them feature a party
to the conflict which departs sharply from the law of occupation’s
fundamental
legal
principles
of
temporality
and
acknowledgment of reversion to the legitimate sovereign, or the
Lebanon War, BBC (May 6, 2008, 5:18 PM GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/middle_east/7381389.stm.
98. On March 19, 2011, a multi-state NATO-led coalition began a military
intervention in Libya ostensibly to implement Security Council Resolution. S.C.
Res. 1937 (Mar. 17, 2011).
99. See Adam Roberts, NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo, 41
SURVIVAL 102, 102-23 (1999).
100. S.C. Res. 1236 (May 7, 1999) (proposing the United States assist with
the East Timor Special Autonomy Referendum); Roberts, supra note 99; Iraq
War Illegal, Says Annan, BBC (Sept. 16, 2004, 09:21 AM), http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm.
101. See Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 16; SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20,
at 346.
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principle of minimal intervention of the occupying power in the
administration of the local population.102
1. Transformative Occupation
Transformative occupation is a good example where the
aforementioned binary structure is ill-suited, disrupting the
balance of two of the fundamental principles of the law of
occupation—civilian
protection
and
temporality.103
Contemporary transformative occupations are often perceived
as situations where “good” occupying states take control over
“bad” regimes.104 As noted, this is inconsistent at best with the
historical assumption of the law of occupation that aims to avoid
judging whether the occupiers are the “good” actors and the
ousted sovereign the “bad” actor. Such law supports reversion to
the ousted, yet legitimate sovereign.105 If anything, the Fourth
Geneva Convention is suspicious of occupation becoming a form
of annexation—as in the case of Nazi Germany in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union.106 There is little doubt, however,
that the 1949 drafters were fully cognizant of the
paradigmatically “transformative occupations” of Germany and
102. See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, arts. 43, 53–55;
GREENSPAN, supra note 18, at 605; SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 317;
Roberts, supra note 85.
103. One consequence of this dynamic today is an emphasis on “occupation”
defined as a territory subject to the control of a foreign state through the
presence of its forces. In contrast to “occupation” as the outcome of war or
hostilities (by referring to the process e.g. a military invasion), the latter
definition is seldom used today as it tends to engage a debate that many
sovereigns would prefer to avoid. Specifically, the debate regarding the legality
or illegality of an occupation by reference to the legality of the underlying
conflict. Particularly where the territory has come to be under the
administration or authority of international organizations and even more where
the legality of the resort to force that eventually led to international
administration is contested, it is more acceptable today to define occupation as
“neutrally” as possible. One way to do so is to refer to “control of territory by
outside entities” through the presence of foreign armed forces, whether it be
state occupation or international administrations. Steven R. Ratner, Foreign
Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The Challenges of
Convergence, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 695, 697 (2005); Ralph Wilde, From Trusteeship
to Self-Determination and Back Again: The Role of the Hague Regulations in the
Evolution of International Trusteeship, and the Framework of Rights and Duties
of Occupying Powers, 31 LOY. L.A. INT’L COMP. L. REV. 85, 89 (2009); ARAITAKAHASHI, supra note 42, at 16; BENVENISTI, supra note 2.
104. Roberts, supra note 85, at 601.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 582–85.
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Japan.107
Transformative occupation is characterized in today’s world
by the lack of territorial aspiration from the occupying states
and acceptance of duties with respect to the civilian population’s
needs as a result of regime change.108 The explicit goals are often
to change states that have failed or are existing under tyrannical
rule.109 A number of examples, including the aftermath of World
War II and Iraq since 2003, show that transformative political
objectives can sometimes arise in occupations or in situations
resembling occupation (as in the U.N.’s administration of postconflict territory).110 As occupying forces have engaged in armed
conflict with jus ad bellum aims that essentially alter the nature
of the legitimate sovereign to which the territory is supposed to
revert (including abolishing it as a government, or perhaps
banishing it from the occupied territory), these forces have
covered increasingly extensive areas of administration over the
occupied civilian population. If a war’s aim is to put boots on the
ground to end a regime and quite possibly make a change in its
political character (establishing democratic governance, for
example), the presence of forces and their security may well
require occupation for some period (as in the case of the United
States in Iraq), and concomitantly, greater responsibility for
civilian needs and administration.111 One could question the
ability of the law of occupation in its traditional sense to
successfully navigate contemporary situations in which the
meaning of its fundamental principles (protection of local
population and temporality) seem unavoidably under stress.
Occupations aimed at regime change usually contain
transitional periods that run from the end of occupation through
the restoration of a new government invested with
sovereignty.112 Exactly how these transformative occupations
proceed, however, is variable. The end of occupation in such
situations is not a moment in time but a gradual evolution of
both the authority of local government and its acquisition of
legitimacy with the local population.113
In addition, the lines between war and peace are blurred
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 601–03.
BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 275.
Roberts, supra note 85, at 580.
Id. at 581.
Id.
See supra notes 47–52.
BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 255.
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when occupation is not strictly a security measure in the midst
of an interstate war. Whereas war often contains clear, longterm goals for the parties, peace agreements or other
instruments that aim to settle a conflict are not necessarily
relevant to the end of many contemporary occupations.114 After
all, in transformative conflicts and occupations featuring regime
change, there is no longer a “hostile” sovereign party to reach
peace with; there may instead be a newly installed interim
government, existing with or without international approval,
with which the occupier can sign an agreement giving consent to
the presence of its forces.115 Such legal processes are simply not
what the law of occupation contemplates as constituting
agreements to end the conflict or to end the occupation
administration and return the occupied territory to its ongoing,
legitimate—even if losing—sovereign.
Transformative conflict in the post-Cold War period has
typically not been governed by appeal to the law of belligerent
occupation but instead by other bodies of law, particularly the
Resolutions of the Security Council. The 2003 United States-led
forces’ invasion and occupation of Iraq, a case where a state
admitted that it was an occupier under the law of occupation, is
the exception, not the rule. In Kosovo and East Timor, for
example, the circumstances of international politics and
diplomacy removed transformative conflicts from the purview of
the law of occupation to other structures of international law and
institutions, including the Security Council.116 This rendered it
unnecessary to acknowledge the ways in which the law of
occupation failed to address such situations.117

114. Gabriella Blum, The Fog of Victory, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 391, 391–421
(2013); Rostow, supra note 14, at 219.
115. See Ratner, supra note 103, at 699 n.15. For example, the goal of the
occupation in Iraq was to accomplish regime change in favor of democracy.
However, the occupation in Iraq ended before this goal was achieved, and a
transitional government was installed as a result. The same is true in
Afghanistan. The goal of the occupation was to fight Al-Qaeda and the Taliban
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Here, the occupation also
ended before that goal was achieved, and the presence of the former occupying
states’ forces has continued for many years. Blum, supra note 114, at 400.
116. Hilary Charlesworth, Law After War, 8 MELB. J. INT’L L. 233, 236
(2007).
117. Id.
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2. Lengthy Occupation
Beyond transformative occupation, cases of continuing,
lengthy occupation, particularly in geographically adjacent
territories, offer another reason for some commentators to
question the relevance of the law of occupation as an adequate
paradigm in contemporary conflicts.118 Despite the definition
and normative principle of occupation as always and necessarily
a temporary measure, since 1945, several occupations have
persisted long after hostilities ceased. These cases include
Israel’s control over Gaza and the West Bank, Turkey’s control
over Northern Cyprus, Morocco’s control over Western Sahara,
Indonesia’s control over East Timor and South Africa’s control
over Namibia.119 The main problem with prolonged occupation
is eventual dependency on the occupying state by the local
population. Dependency is manifested, as noted in the example
of Gaza, through services the occupying state provides to the
local population in the occupied territory, including
transportation, education, health services, financial services,
infrastructure, employment options, etc.120 Disconnecting and
“unwinding” such a long-standing dependence will often require
considerable time, and in many cases, the process requires a
significant transitional period of transferring power to local
authorities.121 During this period, from the end of occupation
118. Vaios Koutroulis, The Application of International Humanitarian Law
and International Human Rights Law in Situation of Prolonged Occupation:
Only a Matter of Time?, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 165, 170-71 (2012); Roberts,
supra note 85, at 582..
119. See generally Roberts, supra note 85, at 582. For background on Israel’s
prolonged occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, see Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136 (July 9). For background on Turkey’s prolonged
occupation of Northern Cyprus, see Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶
70, 75–76 (May 10). For background on Morocco’s prolonged control over
Western Sahara, see U.N. S.C., Rep. of the Secretary-General on South Sudan,
U.N. Doc. S/2014/158 (Apr. 10, 2014). For background on Indonesian long-term
control of East Timor (until 2002), see Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v.
Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 90, ¶ 13–17 (June 30). For a discussion of
South African long-term control of Namibia (until 1990), see Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16 (June 21).
120. See generally Al-Bassiouni, supra note 3.
121. Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel et al.,
Judgment, HCJ 2056/04, ¶ 27 (June 30, 2004), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_
ENG/04/560/020/A28/04020560.A28.pdf; ANTONIO CASSESE, THE HUMAN
DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 257 (2008); Koutroulis, supra note 118, at
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until full restoration of local authority, the local population is at
risk of being left unprotected.
3. Unilateral Termination of Occupation
Unilateral conflict management is intended to persuade the
other side to refrain, restrain or even end violence through the
adoption of unilateral strategies.122 One of these is a separation
strategy—unilateral disengagement—where one side leaves a
disputed area in order to bring about the termination of a conflict
or to reduce it by eliminating one of its motivating sources.123
Contemporary cases where occupying states decide to
unilaterally terminate their involvement by withdrawing their
forces, thereby ending their effective control, further question
the contemporary relevance of the law of occupation. In the
absence of a peace agreement or mutually negotiated
“handover,” if the ousted legitimate sovereign does not
effectively take on governance obligations, unilateral
withdrawal risks leaving the local population alone to deal with
the challenge of rebuilding public order and safety.124 In
discussing unilateral termination, observers sometimes point to
two salient cases: Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Southern
Lebanon in 2000 and its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza
Strip in 2005.125 Although Israel decided to end the occupation
unilaterally in both of these scenarios, they unfolded quite
differently, mainly with respect to a vacuum in governance, a
trigger for applying any post-occupation obligations with respect
to providing public order. Unlike the case of Gaza, Israel’s
unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon was coordinated
with the international community, and the Security Council
issued a formal resolution recognizing the end of this
occupation.126 In these two cases, unilateral disengagement
166–67.
122. TOV ET AL., THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: FROM CONFLICT
RESOLUTION TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 12–18 (Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov ed.
2007).
123. Id. at 16.
124. See Benvenisti, Unilateral Termination, supra note 8, at 371–82.
125. See Rostow, supra note 14.
126. Id.; See U.N. Secretary-General, Report on the Implementation of
Security Council Resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), U.N. Doc. S/2000/460
(May 22, 2000); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Endorses
Secretary-General’s Conclusion on Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon as of 16
June, U.N. Press Release SC/6878 (June 18, 2000). Israel controlled only ten
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failed to end the conflict but enabled its management without
forces remaining on the ground.127
The law of occupation has not developed sufficiently to
respond to ambiguous situations where it is not clear who has
the rights and duties of governance.128 Occupying forces may
leave, yet sometimes the local government of the occupied
territory or the returning sovereign cannot independently
perform all the activities required to ensure safety and pubic
order for the local population. Although there are situations in
which international organizations step in to play this role—in
transformative occupations, for example—this is not always the
case.129 It might be said, however, that the problem is not that
the law of occupation is inadequate to the task; it is rather that
its rules quite deliberately privilege the principle of temporality
for protecting sovereignty over the civilian protection principle
in this circumstance.130 Faced with the possibility of a failure of
governance for civilians, or creating rules that might be seen to
justify the continued presence of Nazi Germany’s troops in an
Eastern European country during World War II, one could point
out that the rules comprehend the dilemma and make a
deliberate choice (hence this bias is a “feature,” not a “bug”). Yet
in contemporary times, over half a century beyond the drafting
of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, these inadequacies have
created complexities on the ground where the duties and
obligations of the various international actors are insufficiently
identified.131
This legal gap is, in fact, a source of significant practical
dilemmas today. In the case of Gaza, for instance, there have
been serious electricity shortages.132 Israel is no longer an
percent of the Lebanese territory as security zone, which included around
150,000 citizens. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) controlled daily life within the
Southern Lebanon security zone and most of the local population was employed
by Israel or by the local militia that collaborated with Israel. The level of
effective control that Israel exercised in Southern Lebanon was, to some extent,
lower with respect to restoring “public order” without establishing a military
administration. In addition, the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) mission had coexisted with the IDF in the territory since 1978. Id.
127. See Rostow, supra note 14.
128. See Boon, supra note 7, at 57; Kristen E. Boon, The Future of the Law
of Occupation, 46 CAN. Y.B. OF INT’L LAW 107–142 (2009).
129. Kristen E. Boon, The Future of the Law of Occupation, 46 CAN. Y.B. OF
INT’L LAW 107–142 (2009).
130. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 42.
131. See BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 9, 203.
132. See ANDREA BIANCHI & YASMIN NAQVI, INTERNATIONAL
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occupying power in Gaza and, as a result, does not carry ongoing
obligations for its population’s public order and safety (apart
from obligations imposed by Israeli High Court decisions for
required humanitarian needs).133 The Palestinian Authority
exerted de-facto control over the territory beginning in 1993.134
Since 2007, it no longer controls the territory and its
replacement, Hamas, has hijacked the infrastructure for its own
purposes.135 Hamas is engaged in an ongoing armed conflict
against Israel and prefers to employ its electricity to
manufacture rockets instead of distributing it to the local
population.136 Additionally, in retaliation for ongoing attacks
against its citizens, Israel has attacked Gaza’s electric
infrastructure and reduced its power supply.137 Although Gaza

HUMANITARIAN LAW AND TERRORISM 90 (2011).
133. Id.
134. See HCJ 9132/07 Gaber Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister. ¶¶ 12–15
(2008) (Isr.) (unpublished), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/07/320/091320.
n25.htm.
135. See generally Charlesworth, supra note 117 (assuming that the
occupation administration left little mark on the local governmental structure
or the provision of basic services because the Palestinian Authority was
exercising effective control since 1993 according to the terms agreed in the Oslo
Accords).
136. Id.
137. Id.; Gaza’s Only Power Plant Destroyed in Israel’s Most Intense Air
Strike Yet, THE GUARDIAN (July 30, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2014/jul/29/gaza-power-plant-destroyed-israeli-airstrike-100-palestiniansdead; Avi Bell, Israel May Stop Supplying Water and Electricity to Gaza, A Legal
Opinion, KOHELET POLICY FORUM (July 2014), http://en.kohelet.org.il/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/israel-may-stop-supplying-water-and-electricity-toGaza-updated.pdf; Tomer Broude et al., Legal Opinion: Israel’s Duty to Supply
Electricity and Water to Gaza, (July 20, 2014), http://gisha.org/UserFiles/
File/publications/letters/letter-en-20-7-14.pdf; Michael Bothe, Preliminary
Expert Opinion: Cutting off Electricity and Water Supply for the Gaza Strip
Limits Under International Law (July 18, 2014), http://www.diakonia.se/
globalassets/documents/ihl/ihl-resources-center/expert-opinions/michael-bothejuly-17.pdf (explaining that on September 2016, Israel gave the PA autonomy
over the distribution of electricity within its territories for the first time, but as
is well known, the PA does not control the territory of Gaza). See Tovah Lazaroff
& Adam Rasgon, Israel Gives Palestinians Autonomy Over Electricity in Debt
Pay-Back Plan, THE JERUSALEM POST (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.jpost.com/
Israel-News/PA-gets-autonomy-over-electricity-signs-plan-to-pay-debt-467665
(explaining that the electricity crisis worsened and restricted the population to
3-4 hours of power a day (as opposed to 8 hours). It sparked protests and unrest
in the Gaza Strip, which eased after Qatar donated $12 million to buy fuel for
the Palestinian power plant); Gaza Power Crisis Eases as Qatar Donates $12
Million to Buy Fuel, VOA NEWS (Jan. 16, 2017, 10:54 AM), http://www.voanews.
com/a/gaza-power-crisis-eases-as-qatar-donates-12-million-dollars-to-buyfuel/3678171.html.
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has been essentially neglected with regard to governance for
many years, political considerations appear to have prevented
the parties involved and the international community from
recognizing that formal occupation ended in Gaza when Israel
Governance
responsibilities
withdrew
its
forces.138
correspondingly have reverted back to the status quo ante. If one
accepts the legal analysis that military presence is a necessity
for establishing occupation, the legal conclusion is sound. The
consequence, however, is territory that lacks essential services
for the local population.
This deep tension between the principles, temporality and
civilian protection, while evident in such contemporary
occupations as Israel and Gaza, is far less visible in recent
transformative occupations where the international community
has taken on a role beyond the occupier and returning sovereign.
In these situations, authoritative international bodies, such as
the U.N. Security Council are able to bridge the gap, at least as
a legal matter, between the actions of the former occupier and
the actions of the “legitimate sovereign.”139 But in situations that
lack this kind of legitimacy and international authority, there is
a distinct possibility that under the law of occupation, there is
no viable legal framework for concluding an occupation in ways
that fully ensure the protection of the civilian population.140 The
flawed assumption of the law of belligerent occupation, creating
its significant weakness, is that there will always be a returning
138. See generally TOV ET AL., supra note 122 (regarding the last events of
armed conflict between Hamas and Israel have strongly established that it is
inconceivable that Israel would be able to retain control over Gaza or that the
local population would agree to such a scenario). Israel is unable to exist with
military forces in the territory without being involved in bloody battles.
Furthermore, Hamas would not allow Israel to maintain even the slightest
presence in its territory. Israel has had no effective governmental control since
the period when the PA controlled Gaza. A significant difference during that
period was that there was both an Israeli military presence and Israeli
settlements in the territory. Today, with no military presence and effective selfgovernmental control over the area, the argument that Israel continues to
occupy Gaza is very weak. Id.
139. See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, arts. 53–54.
140. Martti Koskenniemi, Occupation and Sovereignty – Still a Useful
Distinction?, in LAW AT WAR: THE LAW AS IT WAS AND THE LAW AS IT SHOULD
BE 163–64 (Ola Engdahl & Pål Wrange eds., 2008); Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M.
Gross & Keren Michaeli, Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 551 (2005); Davis P. Goodman, The Need for
Fundamental Change in the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1573 (1985); Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 1 (2006); BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 1–19; BIANCHI & NAQVI, supra
note 132; Boon, supra note 7, at 58; Roberts, supra note 14, at 27.
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sovereign to prevent a lengthy vacuum of authority.
IV.

THE EXISTING LAW OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION DOES NOT CREATE POSTOCCUPATION OBLIGATIONS

Ending contemporary conflicts ill-suited to the legal
paradigm of the law of occupation can jeopardize the safety of
the civilian population, prompting inquiry into whether the law
of belligerent occupation imposes continuing duties on a former
occupier. Although the binary model works to carry out the
temporality principle, we have ample evidence as to how it could
be less effective with respect to the civilian protection principle
of the law.141
The reality of situations like Gaza and Iraq, two prominent
cases where the law of occupation was applied, has ignited the
need to look for legal principles tailored for a transitional stage
in many contemporary conflicts. Both cases have left open
questions regarding “effective control” and the factual basis for
the end of occupation, along with the post-occupation obligations
of the former occupying states to ensure that territory is not left
ungoverned in the aftermath.
A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF POST-OCCUPATION DUTIES WITHIN
THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
Since the post-World War II era, scholarship on issues of
post-occupation has focused on the effectiveness of decisions
made by the occupying state during the period of its control.
Consistent with the law of occupation, the focus centers on the
extent the new local government is bound by those decisions
after the end of occupation.142 Although it is a general rule that
occupation laws no longer necessarily apply upon the
termination of occupation, the text of the law of occupation does
not address itself to the specifics of legal norms that should
govern the occupying state’s obligations in the period leading up
to and during the end of occupation and its relations to the
returning sovereign.143 The temporality principle for protecting
141. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 125 (July 9).
142. BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 18; Roberts, supra note 22, § 44, at 8.
143. ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 42, at 25; Benvenisti, Unilateral
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the sovereignty of the occupied territory, already much
discussed, remains a general policy concern that is central to the
fundamental principles of the law.144
As such, the law of belligerent occupation traditionally does
not take into account the implications for the occupying state at
the end of occupation; its obligations end and the legal effects of
its acts are for the local population and the returning sovereign
to assess, then maintain or reject. During the first decades
following World War II, discussions amongst scholars and
tribunals regarding the implications of the end of occupation
largely overlooked any presumed ongoing duties the occupier
might have post-occupation.145 It is safe to say that the
assumption of these discussions was that occupier’s obligations
terminated with the end of occupation or, at most, by reference
to a transfer of authority agreement. Post-occupation obligations
in both the Hague law and Geneva law merely consist of
transitional duties. Neither supplies positive duties that require
the occupying state to continue to exercise administrative
control beyond a limited transition period that, as noted earlier,
is formally agreed to by the parties.
The absence of continuing duties is significant. For example,
Articles 53 and 54 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provide that
certain items seized or destroyed by the occupant must “be
restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.”146 The
third paragraph of Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
(hereafter “Article 6(3)”) applies some duties to the occupying
state and refers to cases of post-hostilities occupation, which is
still belligerent occupation but only addresses the transitional
period pending the conclusion of a peace treaty.147 These
Termination, supra note 7, at 371-82.
144. Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M. Gross & Keren Michaeli, Illegal
Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 551, 575 (2005). The occupying state holds the territory in trusteeship and is
allowed to take temporary measures to restore public order and safety, and to
ensure its military necessities eligible by the law. The assumption of the law is
that any temporary measure carried out by the occupying state does not survive
unless the local population (or, alternatively, the returning sovereign) so
wishes. Under these assumptions, the status quo should be kept until the end
of occupation. Id.
145. See, e.g., SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 347.
146. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, arts. 53–54.
147. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 27, art. 6(3) (“In the case of
occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one
year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying
Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such
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provisions are striking because they either relate to
compensation for wrongs committed during the occupation
period, or else concern a specific transitional period as agreed
among the parties.
Article 6(3) of the Fourth Geneva Convention does provide
that as long as the occupation is in progress and the occupying
state still exercises governmental functions, the Convention’s
provisions remain operative.148 Interpreting this Article,
however, the ICJ pointed out that a distinction is made “between
provisions applying during military operations leading to
occupation and those that remain applicable throughout the
entire period of occupation.”149 As a result, the ICJ said with
regard to Israel that “[s]ince the military operations leading to
the occupation of the West Bank in 1967 ended a long time ago,
only those articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention referred to
in Article 6(3) remain applicable in that occupied territory.”150
This would seem to support the idea that the end of occupation
is the winding down and termination of the occupier’s legal
duties, save for the process of transition.151
Power exercises the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions
of the following Articles of the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49,
51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143.”); DINSTEIN, supra note 226, at 281.
148. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 27, art. 6(3).
149. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 16, ¶ 125 (July 9).
150. Id.
151. It should be noted, however, that some scholars found the ICJ’s
interpretation of Article 6(3) to be incorrect. For example, Dinstein argues that
the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Wall case is confusing, since it suggests that
the one-year clock started ticking as soon as the Israeli occupation began back
in 1967, arguably a premature point in time after which several surges of
hostilities took place in Gaza and the West Bank. DINSTEIN, supra note 26, at
282–83. He suggests that Article 6(3) is analogous to an accordion, which may
be compressed one year after the general close of military operations and
stretched out if hostilities resume, and so on. This was not the interpretation
the ICJ gave to Article 6(3), and though it might be a plausible
construction/reading of the Article, it is not the most obvious one. Id. The oneyear stipulation was later abrogated by Article 3(b) of AP1, though not the
general idea that, consonant with the temporary nature of occupation,
transitional periods even under AP1 cannot remain indefinite when the
returning sovereign is unwilling or unable to take on its rights and obligations
of governance. AP1, supra note 27, art. 3(b) (“[T]he application of the
Conventions and of this Protocol shall cease, in the territory of Parties to the
conflict, on the general close of military operations and, in the case of occupied
territories, on the termination of the occupation, except, in either circumstance,
for those persons whose final release, repatriation or re-establishment takes
place thereafter. These persons shall continue to benefit from the relevant
provisions of the Conventions and of this Protocol until their final release,
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In any event, Article 6(3) stipulates that the law of
occupation is invoked to preserve the obligation of a state for the
duration of occupation as long as it still exercises some
governmental functions without the consent of the local
population in the territory.152
The Fourth Geneva Convention’s text regarding these
obligations remains conceptually limited by reference to the
temporality principle. It is practically limited by the fact that it
contemplates a transition—a transfer from one party to another.
The period is not a permanent condition, and interpretations of
the law of occupation building on Article 6(3) must take this into
account. The text was originally conceived to address a narrow
transition regime limited in scope and time, and intended to
balance both fundamental legal principles of the law of
occupation, much discussed in this paper, as they appeared to
the drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention at the end of
World War II: (1) ensuring civilian humanitarian protection and
essential governance needs for security, order, and essential
services; and (2) enforcing the temporary nature of an
occupation to prevent creeping annexation.153
The most accurate reading of the law of occupation, then, is
that it does not itself provide or trigger anything other than a
narrowly transitional regime of post-occupation obligations
intended to transfer the rights and duties of governance over the
occupied zone and its population to the returning sovereign.
There is no positive rule or norm of post-occupation obligations
in the sense of a continuing obligation to provide for the local
population’s needs for public order and safety once the occupier
has physically withdrawn.
repatriation or re-establishment.” (emphasis added)); Rubin, supra note 25, at
553–54.
152. See Ronen, supra note 7.
153. PICTET COMMENTARY GC IV, supra note 19, at 58-64. Article 3(b) of AP1
does not change this fundamental conceptual point, even as it annuls the oneyear rule of the Fourth Geneva Convention and extends its application to all
protected persons until their final release, repatriation, or re-establishment—
that is to say, even after the general close of military operations or the
termination of occupation. ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 42, at 1, 17. Article 3(b)
aims to safeguard a civilian’s human rights until that individual’s protection is
secured, even long after the end of occupation of the territory, but it does not in
itself trigger positive post-occupation obligations to ensure public order and
safety for the local population based on the limited transitional regime of the
law of occupation. AP1 Article 3 does not prevent legal gaps that would leave
the civilian population at risk through a lack of governance; it is strictly a
protective measure for individuals, not the creation of a general regime of postoccupation obligations.
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Whatever the precise contours of the transition provisions
of the law of occupation, they are no longer transitional if they
turn out to be functionally permanent in practice. This is so
whether one refers to duties toward the civilian population or
rights over it. The law of occupation, as it developed over time,
did not contemplate long-term occupations like Turkey in
Northern Cyprus and Israel in Gaza, much less the kind of
“transformative occupations” of today, such as Iraq and
Afghanistan. Yet, as the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) has always emphasized, IHL is sufficiently robust
and flexible to adapt to changing circumstances without needing
to adopt new legal prescriptions.154
B. STATE PRACTICE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF POSTOCCUPATION DUTIES
In the actual practice of states, there is little support for the
theory of post-occupation responsibility. Although not a
consequence of occupation per se, cases such as Kosovo and East
Timor have featured international administration of territories
that, in practice, constituted an international mandate to
rebuild the political, social, and economic institutions of the
administered territory.155 In certain key aspects, the goals of
post-occupation obligations and the law of occupation are
analogous: “to govern on a temporary basis, and to strike a
balance between overall administrative authority of the outside
power and the non-alienability of the sovereignty of the territory
concerned.”156 On the other hand, cases such as Kosovo and East
Timor are essentially examples of international trusteeship,
with a core feature that in each case the local population
welcomed the outside international administration and forces
because they saw them as protection against hostile forces
outside the territory. In this regard, the contrast with genuinely
belligerent occupation could not be more explicit.157
154. See generally JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 59 (1985) (“[T]he minimum principles of
humanitarian law are valid at all times, in all places and under all
circumstances, applying even to states which may not be parties to the
Conventions, because they express the usage of peoples.”).
155. See Roberts, supra note 22, ¶ 50, at 939; Dr. Emmanuel Vianès, What
is an International Post Belligerent Administration?, 25 IND. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 421 (2015).
156. Roberts, supra note 22, ¶ 50, at 939.
157. See ERIC D. PATTERSON, ENDING WARS WELL: ORDER, JUSTICE, AND
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U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 regarding the end of
United States-led powers in Iraq provided its own tools to ensure
the occupying state’s accountability to and respect for the law.158
Its approach differs from the situations described above, because
the United States acknowledged that it was, for a time, an
occupier under occupation law.159 In so doing, the resolution set
an example for future occupations and could fill a serious gap in
the law of belligerent occupation, possibly ensuring that
territory is not left ungoverned during transitional periods. It
does not alter the law of occupation as such, but instead
supplements it with an exogenous legal authority via the
Security Council.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 might be offered to
support the argument that, in some contemporary occupations,
the occupying state is subject to additional duties toward the
occupied population.160 The difficulty here is that the very
existence of a Security Council resolution makes it unclear
whether these duties conferred on United States-led forces as
the occupier arise from the law of belligerent occupation or from
the Security Council’s special legal authority.161
CONCILIATION IN CONTEMPORARY POST-CONFLICT 168 (2012).
158. See S.C. Res. 1483, art. 9 (May 22, 2003). Security Council Resolution
1483 supported the formation of an Iraqi interim administration, a transitional
administration run by Iraqis, which would govern until an internationally
recognized, representative government was established by the people of Iraq to
assume the former responsibilities of the occupying states. It also facilitated the
appointment of a special U.N. representative for Iraq whose independent
responsibilities involved reporting regularly to the Council on his activities
under the resolution, coordinating activities of the U.N. in post-conflict
processes in Iraq, and among U.N. and international agencies engaged in
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in Iraq. In coordination
with the occupying states, the U.N. representative was also tasked with
assisting the people of Iraq in multiple areas, including restoring and
establishing national and local institutions for representative governance,
facilitating the reconstruction of key infrastructure, promoting economic
reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development, encouraging
international efforts to contribute to basic civilian administration functions,
promoting the protection of human rights, encouraging international efforts to
rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civilian police force and encouraging
international efforts to promote legal and judicial reform. The Security Council
resolution further established a Development Fund for Iraq to address the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people for the economic reconstruction and
repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, the country’s continued disarmament, the costs
of an Iraqi civilian administration, and other purposes benefiting the people of
Iraq. See id.
159. Id.
160. BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 270.
161. Id.

48

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1

There was also concern in the Iraq case that the Security
Council had overreached its jurisdiction, setting up a scenario
where the law of occupation could not support all that it might
be called upon to do.162 The transition to democracy represented
a radical departure from the traditional conservationist
principles underlying the law of belligerent occupation.163
The broad mandate granted to the occupying powers in Iraq
during the occupation (and long after its termination) tested the
law of occupation’s limits.164 This action only became permissible
as a result of the local population’s desperate economic and
political situation, the full accountability of the occupying states
with the Security Council, the Security Council’s ratification,
and the fact that the occupiers clearly lacked any territorial
aspirations toward Iraq.165 This scenario was largely enabled
because the occupying state remained present with its military
troops within the territory of the newly re-enshrined sovereign,
the new Iraqi government, which gave its consent for the former
occupier to conduct basic security missions and carry on these
obligations.166 Had United States-led forces not been physically
present in the territory, such tasks likely would have been
impossible to carry out—irrespective of whether there was a
claim of a post-occupation legal obligation to maintain public
security and order. Thus, it would be difficult to draw the legal
conclusion that occupation carries post-occupation obligations
on the former occupier from the sparse incidence of state practice
with respect to acknowledged occupation.
C. SCHOLARLY VIEWS ON THE EXISTENCE (OR NOT) OF POST
OCCUPATION OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LAW OF
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
Some scholars who support the argument that the law of
occupation creates post-occupation obligations claim that legal
norms for these obligations logically derive from the law of
belligerent occupation itself.167 Cassese, for example, argues
that the body of the law of occupation should be interpreted in a
162. See id. at 268.
163. Id. at 269.
164. See Robert, supra note 2, ¶ 48, at 938.
165. See BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 264–75.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Applicability of the Law of Occupation, 99
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 29 (2005).
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“flexible” way with a process of “adjustment” to the new context
in which contemporary conflicts operate, while maintaining its
original objectives and principles.168 Consequently, in his view,
the Hague Regulations should be interpreted in light of
developments in international law and the factual developments
that have occurred since its drafting in 1907, with a particular
eye to cases of prolonged occupation.169
In Roberts’ view, since determining the precise moment
occupation ends may hold less significance, the current priority
is applying the law in a wide variety of situations, even
occasionally where no occupation has been declared to exist, or
in cases where occupation has been pronounced terminated.170
Benvenisti suggests that the obligations of occupying states
under the law of occupation should be interpreted as also
entailing obligations to ensure ongoing public order and civil life
as much as possible, not only during the occupation, but also
immediately after its end and during the transition of authority
to the sovereign local government.171 Therefore, Benvenisti
stresses that the nineteenth-century conception based on Article
43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations should be interpreted without
its traditional constraints and instead with contemporary
perceptions of the broad authority post-conflict societies require
for preventing chaos and restoring public order.172
Rubin suggests that restricting the ability of the occupying
state to withdraw from the occupied territory before reaching
resolution of all territorial issues is against existing legal
principle.173 He also holds that extending the state of occupation
beyond the actual period of occupation negates the principle that
occupation should reflect facts on the ground.174 Additionally he
suggests a better approach would be to enable the occupying
state to end its presence in the occupied territory without
terminating its responsibilities toward it.175 Once the occupying
state is no longer in effective control of the territory, the trigger
to apply post-occupation obligations in the scope of the law of
occupation should derive from either the consent or request of
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

CASSESE, supra note 121, at 255.
Id.
Roberts, supra note 22, § 57, at 10.
Benvenisti, Unilateral Termination, supra note 7, at 371–82.
Benvenisti, supra note 167, at 30–31.
Rubin, supra note 25, at 549–50
Id.
Id.
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the local government or a decision of the international
community.176
This canvassing of different scholarly views on the question
of post- occupation obligations points to a general dissatisfaction
with what is, in fact, the law of occupation as legal text: a strict
binary. It makes excellent sense, as these eminent scholars say,
that foreign occupying forces are permitted to remain and
support the transition in a transformative occupation, such as
Iraq. This type of movement—from “occupier” to “invited
guest”—permits flexibility in the obligations and powers of an
occupier/invited guest during the transition; however, scholars
generally note that in such cases, the occupation is actually no
longer belligerent but in a different process—for example, a legal
or constructive international trusteeship.
Still other commentators insist that the law of occupation
addresses belligerent occupation. Accordingly, transformative
occupations and similar processes should apply the appropriate
bodies of law after the occupation, such as deferring to the
special authorities of the Security Council.177 The law of
occupation provides the occupying power with coercive measures
for installing its authority.178 It is therefore problematic to argue
that these measures should extend after the end of occupation,
when it is impossible to assign the ousted local government any
measures of governance without legitimacy and consent granted
by the returning sovereign. For that matter, some commentators
note that the law of occupation applies only to define
contemporary war-to-peace transitions of international
character where the occupier must be exercising effective control
while physically present in the occupied territory, and the actors
involved must be contracting parties to the Geneva Conventions
for its application.179 If these are the terms, it is impossible to
176. Id. at 552–53.
177. Id. at 551.
178. Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws
of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580, 595 (2006).
179. Kristen E. Boon, The Future of the Law of Occupation, 46 CAN. Y.B. OF
INT’L LAW, 107, 110–14 (2009); Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 27, art.
2 (“In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall
also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in
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draw post-occupation obligations from the law of occupation
after occupation terminates.
It is hard to argue with this admittedly hardline reaction
against turning the law of occupation into an exceedingly flexible
body of law for foreign forces on another sovereign’s territory.
The more open approach compromises, after all, the
fundamental principle of the law of occupation—the temporality
principle. It also engages a level of wishful thinking regarding
the many obligations this would impose on the international
community. Perhaps the best conclusion to draw from these
unsettled, cross-cutting positions adopted by commentators and
scholars is that the law of belligerent occupation does not create
a regime of ongoing post-occupation obligations beyond its
textual transition regime. Above all, in my view, the law of
belligerent occupation must be preserved distinctly for its
unique function: belligerent occupation.
There are many possibilities that might trouble both a
former occupier and a newly restored sovereign with respect to
ongoing obligations claimed to derive from the law of occupation
after the occupation ends. These possibilities bear noting as a
caution against excessive enthusiasm for finding ways to
establish such obligations. One way to understand the cautions
against excessively embracing post-occupation duties grounded
in the law of occupation is to ask why, if this approach is so
obvious and promising, the formal law of occupation has not
already evolved toward formal acceptance of a regime of postoccupation law. The answer takes us back to the temporality
principle.180 Despite its honorable origin in a desire to render
illegal the annexation of territory through occupation that was a
feature of World War II, this principle seemed somehow quaint
after the end of the Cold War and the celebration of the decline
of sovereignty. Such a perspective seems less desirable today, as
many international actors look, for example, to Russia’s behavior
in Crimea, and suddenly discover a new enthusiasm for
embracing it.181 A deliberate blurring of the lines between
occupation and invitation no longer seems quite as desirable, at
least not without Security Council authority or protection. As
mentioned, Turkey’s activities in Northern Cyprus offer another
their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in
relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof.”).
180. See Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 140, at 592.
181. See Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 16, 17.
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relevant example.182 One conclusion that could be drawn by
sovereigns whose territory is under full or partial occupation,
whether formally acknowledged by the occupier or not, is that
they indeed want a clear line between occupation and nonoccupation. This line is desirable because they legitimately fear
the consequences to their security and territorial integrity
without it.
Although post-occupation obligations derive from situations
of occupation, it does not follow that the status of occupation or
the law of occupation continues to apply after the elements of
occupation have been removed. As Benvenisti implies, in order
for genuine standards of post-occupation obligations to emerge
and be adopted by occupying powers, they should be governed by
principles of focus and limitation.183 Applying the law of
occupation in the post-occupation phase, with all of its
obligations specific to the physical presence of the occupier,
ignores occupation law’s fundamental basis of effective control,
which is largely removed at the stage of post-occupation.184
Moving in this direction, would give few incentives to the
occupying state to end an occupation and allow the local
sovereign government to establish stable administration over
the territory. Removing the law of occupation from its original
role of temporarily restoring and maintaining public order in an
occupied territory and installing it as a law for rebuilding
indigenous local government with legitimate authority and
governance capacity is a perilous enterprise.
Although under some circumstances it might even be
politically desirable within the international community for an
occupier to continue its occupation as long as the sovereign of
that territory is unprepared or unable to take effective control,
there is no legal obligation on the occupier to maintain its
occupation; an occupier is always legally free to withdraw. For
that matter, we should not neglect the possibility that an
occupier will be militarily forced to withdraw in the setting of an
ongoing armed conflict, even though this action could leave the
territory ungoverned.

182. See supra notes 62–64.
183. Benvenisti, Unilateral Termination, supra note 7.
184. Roberts, supra note 22, § 48, at 8.
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V. TRANSITIONAL POST-OCCUPATION OBLIGATIONS
ARISING UNDER AN EXPANSIVE READING OF
THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
The legal conclusions produced by the law of belligerent
occupation leave a significant, unsatisfying gap between the
doctrinal law as it stands today, and current situations of
occupation and its aftermath. It is not just that the legal
conclusions are simply outdated or anachronistic. On the
contrary, the legal conclusions that occupation ends upon the
physical withdrawal of forces from the territory, thereby
extinguishing the legal duties tied to it, have an important
justification in the fundamental motivations underlying the law
of belligerent occupation—the temporality principle. The
“binary” position—that occupation and the ensuing rights and
duties for an occupier are either “on” or “off”—is not just an
accurate description of the law, it also lays down a clear, bright
line that distinguishes when an occupier is entitled to exercise
authority in a foreign territory and when it is not. 185As we have
seen, the difficulty with this approach is that the binary does not
suit how foreign forces begin and end their occupations of
another’s territory and address its population in the diverse
situations of occupation so prevalent today.
The law of belligerent occupation does not create ongoing
post-occupation duties, and the failure of civilian protection is
simply the tradeoff for ensuring that a former occupier actually
gives up its prerogatives. Rather, it seems that the law of
belligerent occupation does offer certain possibilities for
addressing this problem of civilian protection through an
expanded understanding of its existing terms on coordinated
transitions from the former occupier to returning sovereign.
A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSITIONAL POSTOCCUPATION OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LAW OF
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
It is suggested that some form of limited transitional postoccupation obligations (as opposed to post-occupation obligations
and duties on the departing occupier alone) should be triggered
under certain circumstances. These include when the end of
occupation is not a specific moment concluded by a peace
185. See Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 140, at 592.
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agreement and where the specific circumstances indicate that
authority will not be fully restored with the end of occupation.186
Thus, when it is known, as in the cases of Gaza, South Lebanon,
and Iraq, for example, that the end of occupation is approaching
and gaps in essential governance are an issue, transitional postoccupation obligations should be limited in time and scope and
reached by negotiation or coordination of the international
community.
The Fourth Geneva Convention refers, in Article 6(3), to the
cessation of the application of the Convention a year after the
general close of military operations.187 It then provides that
certain measures bind the occupier “for the duration of the
occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions
of government in such territory,” and goes on to list specific
provisions of the Convention.188 AP1 removes the one-year
limitation by reference to the continuing safekeeping of
protected persons as defined by the Convention.189
For the purpose of examining what possibilities exist of an
expanded, yet disciplined, reading of the law of belligerent
occupation in these and other provisions, however, we note that
they point implicitly to a transitional period during which
protected persons continue to be protected, but under which the
occupier withdraws. And, as it withdraws with respect to
exercising the “functions of government”—its obligations as well
as its rights extinguish themselves. Although Article 6(3) does
not specifically mention the returning sovereign in the context
of the transfer of governance authority, it is clear that it
transfers back, to the returning sovereign.190 This is consistent
with the conservationist temporality principle of the law of
belligerent occupation.
The Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention clearly
suggests that the occupier may gradually reduce its obligations
and authority as the returning sovereign gradually assumes
them.191 Although the language of the Convention ceases to
186. See supra notes 8–10.
187. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 27, art. 6(3).
188. See id.
189. See AP1, supra note 27; PICTET, supra note 154.
190. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 27, art. 6(3); see also BenNaftali et al., supra note 140, at 596.
191. See PICTET COMMENTARY GC IV, supra note 19, at 62–66 (“In the
preliminary stages it had been thought that the Convention would only cease
to apply when the occupation itself was at an end. That was what the draft text
adopted by the Stockholm Conference laid down. Several delegations pointed
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apply one year following the close of general hostilities, the
Commentary goes on to make clear that some form of occupation
authorities, functions, and obligations may well last beyond a
year (it references Japan and Germany) and contemplates
exactly this type of sliding scale.192 Yet the Commentary is
referring, in this case, not to post-occupation obligations but
instead to occupation obligations of an occupation that is still
ongoing.193
out at the Diplomatic Conference, however, that if the occupation were to
continue for a very long time after the general cessation of hostilities, a time
would doubtless come when the application of the Convention was no longer
justified, especially if most of the governmental and administrative duties
carried out at one time by the Occupying Power had been handed over to the
authorities of the occupied territory. In 1949 the delegates naturally had in mind
the cases of Germany and Japan. It was finally laid down, therefore, that in
occupied territory the Convention would be fully applicable for a period of one
year, after which the Occupying Power would only be bound by it in so far as it
continued to exercise governmental functions. The solution appears to be a
reasonable one. One year after the close of hostilities, the authorities of the
occupied State will almost always have regained their freedom of action to some
extent; communications with the outside world having been re-established,
world public opinion will, moreover, have some effect. Furthermore, two cases
of an occupation being prolonged after the cessation of hostilities can be
envisaged. When the occupied Power is victorious, the territory will obviously
be freed before one year has passed; on the other hand, if the Occupying Power
is victorious, the occupation may last more than a year, but as hostilities have
ceased, stringent measures against the civilian population will no longer be
justified.”).
How is the end of the occupation of an occupied territory to be
determined? Recent events, and present history, have shown that the
conditions under which wars terminate have undergone a profound
change; and that occupation involves far more than it did formerly. It
therefore seems logical and judicious to provide for a minimum period
during which the provisions should continue to be enforced, a period
fixed at one year after the general conclusion of military operations.
Should occupation continue after that date, it appears normal that the
Occupying Power should gradually hand over the various powers it
exercises, and the direction of the various administrative departments,
to authorities consisting of nationals of the Occupied Power. From that
time on, the Occupying Power will, of course, no longer be in a position
to undertake all the duties for which it was responsible as long as it
continues to exercise the full prerogatives of the occupied State. A choice
should therefore be made between provisions intended to protect the
population of the occupied territory while occupation continues, and
those, on the contrary, which should cease to apply as soon as the
justification for them, namely, the exercise of powers by the Occupying
Power, has ceased to exist.
Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. II-A, at 815
(emphasis added).
192. See PICTET COMMENTARY GC IV, supra note 19, at 62–66.
193. Id.

56

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1

What could be understood to arise from this structure is the
possibility of not exactly “post” occupation duties on the former
occupier but instead a “transitional” regime of the occupier’s
prerogatives and duties as it gradually ceases to exercise the
functions of government in that territory—by reference to the
“duration of the occupation” language of Article 6(3)—for as long
as the occupation continues. To reiterate, the transitional period
might be conceived to cover the period of time – perhaps brief,
perhaps longer—that the occupation continues, and the occupier
continues to exercise rights and duties of governance in the
territory. By its conception, this phase is transitional and
temporary, consistent with the temporality principle of the law
of belligerent occupation; but it is also protective of civilians in
the transition itself.194
What about the returning sovereign? The provisions of the
1907 Hague Regulations (Articles 43, 55) insist that the
governance character of the occupied territory be preserved
except to the extent of military necessity—and by reference to
the (eventual) returning sovereign.195 These provisions
demonstrate the intrinsic role of the returning sovereign during
transition—the sovereign’s governance rights and duties
increasing as the occupier’s rights and duties diminish. It is a
meaningful actor in this transfer. To be clear, I do not want to
overstate the textual basis for asserting that the returning
sovereign has rights and duties in relation to the “transfer back”
of governance authority—Article 6 does not directly mention the
returning sovereign. But, in light of the Fourth Geneva
Convention’s commentary, this approach seems the best reading
of the provisions of the law, seeking to conserve the governance
character of the occupied zone and its population as far as
possible in contemplation of the return of the ousted sovereign.
If this conception holds sway as the general construction of the
law of belligerent occupation, then it seems reasonable to view
this interpretation as the best way to understand the
transitional period during which governmental authority is
transitioned back to the returning sovereign. The implication,
however, is that in order to spare the civilian population a
vacuum of governance, the returning sovereign takes up the
rights and duties of governance in its sovereign territory as the
departing occupier gives theirs.

194. Benvenisti, Unilateral Termination, supra note 7, at 371–82.
195. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 55.
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Maximum coordination best ensures the least risk of
civilians being left without protection through governance, but
in many circumstances, coordination is likely to fall far short of
the ideal. But, this approach diverges from other proposals for
post-occupation duties in that it is not simply a set of obligations
that fall upon the former occupier that lack the requirement of
transition, it imposes the weight of the transfer onto the
returning sovereign.196
Such an extensive reading and interpretation of the law of
belligerent occupation is in line with the fundamental rule of
treaty interpretation as articulated in article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties: “A treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose.”197 Analyzing the commentary of the
Fourth Geneva Convention and its original meaning, the
argument for transitional post-occupation obligations rests on
the following foundational pillars: (1) the object and purpose of
ending occupation, described as a transition process during
which governmental authorities are being transferred from the
occupying power to the returning sovereign; (2) the legal
principle of the law of belligerent occupation that assumes that
the end of occupation is concluded by agreement or consent;198
(3) the balance that the law of occupation strives to maintain
between the two underlying principles of civilian protection and
temporality to protect territory’s sovereignty; (4) the IHL legal
principle of civilian protection, articulated in the Marten Clause,
that protects civilians and belligerents, even in situations
arising from armed conflict that were not anticipated by specific
treaty provisions;199 (5) the evolving customary obligation to
negotiate in good faith in an attempt to end occupation.200 From
all of the above, one might reasonably argue that the current
realities of occupation indeed require the departing occupying
power to accept modest transitional post-occupation duties. This
is a “plausible” and practical reading and interpretation of the
196. See CASSESE, supra note 121, at 255.
197. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31, 32, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
198. See Roberts, supra note 22, § 55, at 9–10.
199. See Meron, supra note 80, at 79 (discussing how the Martens clause is
read broadly to protect and enforce international humanitarian law).
200. E.g., S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 51 (discussing Iraq’s welcoming of
United Nations support during Iraq transitioning to a democratically elected
government).
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law of belligerent occupation in its texts on transitions out of
occupation.
B. A PROPOSAL FOR TRANSITIONAL POST-OCCUPATION
DUTIES: POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON THE INCENTIVES AND
DISINCENTIVES OF THE DEPARTING OCCUPIER AND THE
RETURNING SOVEREIGN
The fact that transitional post-occupation obligations are
reciprocal duties rather than ongoing one-sided obligations of
the former occupier offers the first incentive for their adoption.
These obligations would fall upon both parties (departing
occupier and returning sovereign) in three main scenarios: (1) an
occupying state unilaterally withdraws to end the occupation,
yet its actions still affect the territory; (2) an occupying state’s
armed forces remain in the territory following the end of
occupation for reasons related to operational military necessity
with respect to the conflict itself, but they are not exercising the
authorities of governance required for occupation; or,
alternatively, the occupying state’s forces leave the territory
physically, but continue to undertake military operations
remotely as a matter of military necessity in the unresolved
conflict; or (3) a successor transitional administration takes over
governance of the territory but still needs the involvement of the
former occupying state, as a practical matter, for the duration of
the transition.201
Accordingly, transitional post-occupation obligations would
mean that the occupying state could be subject to certain
transitional duties over the former occupying territory even after
the formal end of occupation—but conceptually, only as a matter
of transition and not as an ongoing unlimited one-sided
obligation. While the former occupying state continues to carry
post-occupation obligations, the incoming power must assume
responsibilities as part of its assumption of sovereign
authority.202 Gradually the burden to provide for the local
population shifts to the sovereign authority.203 The length of this
transition would be determined by facts on the ground as well
as, preferably, negotiations among the parties and perhaps also
with international authorities that could (in some
201. See Roberts, supra note 9, at 250 (explaining three different approaches
to occupation with international military involvement).
202. Benvenisti, Unilateral Termination, supra note 7, at 11.
203. Id. at 7–8.
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circumstances) take on certain governance tasks with respect to
the civilian population.204
In other words, as other scholars have suggested, occupation
can be ended without the automatic extinguishing of every
obligation but only during a transitional period when it is known
that the occupying power’s intention is to end the occupation.205
Transitional post-occupation obligations should be premised on
the continued concern for civil life after the end of occupation
and on the specific, practical reason that such concerns exist.206
During the transitional period, the local government is
obliged to restore its independent authority and either avoid
developing a dependency on the former occupying state or
coordinate in consenting to an ongoing dependency, if necessary,
for ensuring public order and safety for the local population.
Each case should be examined in light of specific circumstances
to determine which transitional post-occupations apply to the
parties and how best to enact the gradual process of ultimately
transferring all authority to the local sovereign.207
Ideally, this process would take place simultaneously and
with parallel commitments, so that the former occupying state
would continue to bear responsibility for authorities that the
local government could not yet perform, while at the same time
it would transfer the appropriate, immediately achievable duties
to the local government. The local government then must do
whatever is necessary to cooperate with the former occupying
state to build its capacity during a limited period of time to
achieve its full independence. During the transitional period,
much emphasis should be placed on the future destiny of
independent authority in the territory, and the ongoing
obligations of the former occupier should be structured to assist
this aim.
Since they are reciprocal, transitional post-occupation
obligations also must address the needs of the occupying state,
taking into account security measures for its population during
the transitional period, especially if the conflict is continuing. An
204. See generally BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 255–56 (discussing the end
of the Iraq occupation effecting previously enacted Resolutions and Coalition
Forces).
205. E.g., Meron, supra note 80, at 87–88 (explaining the modern application
of the Martens clause regulating humanitarian law should conflict arise). See
generally Benvenisti, Unilateral Termination, supra note 7, at 9 (stating
automatic succession to former human rights treaties is strongly desired).
206. Rubin, supra note 25, at 553–54.
207. Ronen, supra note 7, at 445.
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ongoing armed conflict that continues against the former
occupier may have the effect of reducing the level of transitional
post-occupation responsibilities applied to the latter. This could
be especially true in circumstances in which post-occupation
services and provisions are used as a military measure against
the former occupying state by the local government and the
former occupied territory.
The second incentive for the adoption of transitional postoccupation obligations is the utilization of negotiation or
coordination by the international community rather than the
reliance on coercive measures after the end of occupation. The
terms should be negotiated or coordinated once it is known that
the end of occupation is approaching—that is, in the final stages
of an occupation when there is a risk that the withdrawal of the
occupying state will leave the territory ungoverned. One typical
indication of this kind of scenario that occurred in the cases of
both Gaza and Southern Lebanon is the announcement of the
intended withdrawal date of military troops, which also signified
an implied loss of ensured public order and safety.208
Occasionally, political rather than legal considerations
might prevent the parties or the international community from
recognizing the end of occupation in order to prevent the release
of the occupying state from its obligations. That outcome,
however, is inconsistent with core principles of the law of
belligerent occupation, and adopting transitional postoccupation obligations on both the former occupying state and
the returning sovereign could offer a solution. When the end of
occupation is both within reach and yet not assured, voluntarily
assumed, transitional post-occupation obligations should be
used as a means to clarify responsibilities while assuring that
the territory is not left ungoverned or in a highly unstable state.
When transitional post-occupation obligations are required
where the conflict continues, or where the conflict is ended but
the former adversaries are far from friends and negotiation
seems impossible, it is the role of the international community
to step in for the coordination of transitional post-occupation
obligations for both sides. This must occur while recognizing that
occupation has ended, setting the conditions for the transition
period, without which the occupying power would not be released
from its obligations and the returning sovereign would formally
hold responsibility for the territory, whether or not it was
208. E.g., Rubin, supra note 25, at 558 (stating public order is an inadequate
in the Gaza Strip after and before disengagement).
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prepared to do so.209
The international community’s coordination is vital here in
order to maintain effective control after occupation has ended
and until the returning sovereign is able to restore its authority.
It should also be noted that exercising effective control after the
end of occupation requires the legitimacy and consent of the local
government in the former occupied territory.210 The
interpretation of the Fourth Geneva Convention implies
reciprocal post-occupation duties for a transitional period only,
but in order to apply them, the former occupier must have
legitimacy.211
Realizing “legitimacy” in the context of transitional postoccupation obligations may be difficult. Politically, the feelings
of the local population might be so strained that even if the
society accepts transitional post-occupation obligations, the
reality would only allow the acceptance of funds for
compensation but nothing beyond that. Legitimacy for the
application of transitional post-occupation obligations that
entail the ongoing exercise of effective control can be realized
when no tensions between the former occupying power’s interest
in maintaining its security and the local population’s interest in
maintaining its security and welfare exist—typically, this occurs
when the government of the territory has consented to the
involvement of the former occupying power. Such consent must
not have been obtained under duress and must be expressed by
an authority that is empowered to bind the government
concerned.212
The third incentive for the adoption of transitional postoccupation obligations is that they are temporary, transitional
measures, utilized only until the returning or new local regime
has developed independent authority to ensure public order and

209. See U.N. Doc. S/2000/460, supra note 126 (explaining Israel and
Lebanese military relations).
210. Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983
WIS. L. REV. 379, 380–82 (1983). “Legitimacy’ of a social order is the effective
belief in its binding or obligatory quality.” Id. at 380. “It is a state of widespread
belief; namely, the belief that an order is obligatory or exemplary. Moreover,
the belief is a reason for action.” Id. at 382. “[I]n general, the greater the
legitimacy, i.e., the greater the observed belief in the obligatory qualities of an
order, the greater the conformity to the norms believed legitimate.” Id. Ferraro,
supra note 15, at 152, 153.
211. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 27, arts. 2–3.
212. See generally Zwanenburg, supra note 16, at 37–41 (discussing
occupation with prior or existing military conflict).
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safety for the local population; they are not ongoing obligations
for an unknown period of time.213 The main challenge is to
determine when the returning or new local government has
indeed developed its own capability of independence.214 Such a
determination should also consider when the new or returning
local government should have reasonably developed
independence, not just when the local government has actually
gained independence.215 In some cases, all means have been
provided for the local government to exercise its own
administrative authority, and yet these resources are
misappropriated. Common examples include corruption of the
new regime or its funding of militant activities. In such cases,
the local government might find it convenient that the former
occupying state has ongoing responsibilities instead of
addressing these issues itself.
A good reference point to assess the ability of the local
government to exercise effective control may be the preoccupation condition of the former occupied territory, although
that assessment can be misleading in cases of prolonged
occupation or when the right of self-determination is fulfilled for
the first time.216 The danger lies in imposing the costs, in effect,
of a newly returned or newly established local administration’s
corruption or incompetence, potentially in perpetuity, on the
former occupier, which will dissuade it from fulfilling its own
obligations.
The length of time that transitional post-occupation
obligations should apply, then, would depend on the specific local
conditions, and the obligations should end when the local
government is in a position to govern, or when the humanitarian
needs of the local population are no longer attributable to the
end of occupation but instead to the local government.217 As
discussed, great emphasis should be placed on not allowing bad
governance to be rewarded by externalizing those costs onto the
former occupier. Transitional post-occupation obligations should
therefore come with incentives as part of the framework for the
local government to ensure the establishment and rebuilding of
all that is required to effectively self-govern and restore public
213. Benvenisti, Unilateral Termination, supra note 7, at 371, 381; Rubin,
supra note 25, at 553–54.
214. Ronen, supra note 7, at 432.
215. Rubin, supra note 25, at 553–54.
216. Ronen, supra note 7, at 432.
217. Rubin, supra note 25, at 553–54.
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order and safety.
The level of dependency of the local population on the
services and infrastructure provided by the former occupier state
during occupation could be a critical practical factor for devising
and negotiating the duration of transitional post-occupation
obligations. Whether a local population’s dependency on the
occupying state resulted from the period of occupation is a
consideration, and territorial contiguity might impact the scope
and extent of such obligations, as dependency is more likely
when the occupying state is merely across the border.218 If the
local population is not economically dependent upon the
occupying state, then perhaps transitional post-occupation
obligations are not necessary, apart from the transition regime
already contemplated in the law of belligerent occupation.219 If
there is only financial dependency, then post-occupation
obligations may be different from and more limited than those
required after the end of the occupation in cases where the
economy is actually intertwined with that of the occupying
state.220 Clearly, historical sensitivity and contextual awareness
will always be crucial in the construction of any transitional post
occupation obligations.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The law of belligerent occupation does not create one-sided
post-occupation obligations in itself because it is concerned not
only with civilian protection, but also with ensuring that
occupation should be a temporary condition. It contemplates the
return of the legitimate sovereign and ensures that occupation
(or post-occupation duties) do not become a mechanism for
creeping annexation and de facto conquest of territory. Yet with
regard to contemporary conflicts, which do not always fit the
legal binary paradigm of ending occupation, this law leaves the
possibility that in satisfying the conditions of the second
principle, temporality and return of the legitimate sovereign, a
serious gap may exist with regard to the first principle, civilian
218. Ronen, supra note 7, at 434 (explaining dependency is not necessarily a
result of the occupying state’s wrongdoing; it can also be a consequence of
conforming to the law of belligerent occupation requirements).
219. See Ronen, supra note 7, at 435 (discussing occupant obligations under
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations).
220. E.g., id. at 433 (referencing the economic dependence of Northern
Cyprus on Turkey).
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protection. To fill the vacuum, the law of belligerent occupation
could be interpreted, based on Article 6(3) of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, to better accommodate contemporary situations of
occupation.
It is suggested that some form of limited transitional postoccupation obligations should be triggered under certain
circumstances—among others, when the end of occupation is not
a specific moment concluded by a peace agreement and where
the specific circumstances indicate that authority will not be
fully restored with the end of occupation. Thus, when it is known
that the end of occupation is approaching and gaps in essential
governance are an issue, transitional post-occupation
obligations should be limited in time and scope and reached by
negotiation or coordination of the international community.
The interpretation of Article 6(3) of the Fourth Geneva
Convention for transitional post-occupation obligations suggests
that the law of belligerent occupation contains more possibilities
on its own terms than may have previously been thought—and
that in important respects, such an approach extends toward
resolving some of the tensions among the fundamental purposes
underlying the law, minimizing the risk that territory would be
left ungoverned. It also achieves some effect in addressing the
issues of incentives and disincentives regarding the departing
occupier and returning sovereign.
The approach locating transitional post-occupation
obligations under the law of belligerent occupation with respect
to today’s conflicts and occupations (whether acknowledged by
the occupier or not), cautions against creating post-occupation
obligations solely for the former occupier. To foster an effective
transition between occupation and post-occupation the
returning sovereign should assume some obligations as well. The
“transitional post-occupation duties” then, are an attempt to
coordinate the transfer of obligations from occupation to postoccupation—from occupier to returning sovereign—in a manner
that fulfills the civilian humanitarian protection requirements,
even if a formal end to occupation has not been achieved yet.
The weight of international legal norms regarding the local
population’s protection, together with respect for sovereignty,
means that the parties have an obligation to negotiate with each
other in good faith, as the circumstances of the conflict permit,
in order to achieve a coordinated satisfaction of humanitarian
protection for the affected civilian population while ensuring
fulfillment of the territory’s sovereignty. Beyond that, any terms
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more specific than the general motivations of the law of
belligerent occupation seem able to be satisfied by negotiations
between the parties, and, if needed, with the encouragement and
coordination of international authorities in ways that reflect the
realities of any particular conflict and occupation.
Applying transitional post-occupation obligations in the
suggested manner maintains the temporary nature of
occupation, encouraging occupying states to end occupation
without the risk of unlimited ongoing obligations, even as it
requires that they shed an occupier’s rights. Although it cannot
motivate sovereigns essentially uninterested in civilian
protection, either the departing occupier or the returning
sovereign, this approach can at least indicate to them that their
obligations are reciprocal. The requirement of a “handing-over”
of obligations is a sliding scale process, limited in time and scope,
until responsibility for governance is fully restored and the local
population is at least potentially protected. For the occupying
power, it diminishes the worry that it would remain responsible
for the local population as long as the local sovereign failed to
fully exercise governmental authority, no matter the reason and
duration. For the local government, it diminishes the worry that
an occupying state would use post-occupation duties as an
excuse for continuing its control over the territory, eventually
raising the risk of annexation in the name of civilian protection.
The uneasy fit between many contemporary conflicts and
the paradigm of ending occupation according to international
law is an immediate problem that renders local populations
dangerously vulnerable, and will continue to do so. Therefore,
the need for a measured and practical approach, such as
transitional post-occupation obligations that can address
occupations in the current context, is essential.

